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DIGNITY, INEQUALITY, AND STEREOTYPES 
Luke A. Boso* 
Abstract: In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court held that same-sex marriage bans 
violate the Equal Protection Clause for two primary reasons. First, they subordinate; they 
send the message that lesbians and gays are inferior to heterosexuals. Second, they unequally 
deny lesbian and gay individuals the liberty to make fundamental decisions about identity 
and self. These two conjoined themes—anti-group subordination and pro-individual liberty—
comprise the two pillars of “equal dignity” that anchor Obergefell’s holding. This Article 
proposes that these pillars also support the Court’s anti-stereotyping jurisprudence, and equal 
dignity is thus one important aspect of what the Equal Protection Clause protects. To 
illustrate: in sex discrimination cases, courts reject state stereotyping when it perpetuates 
ideas about men’s and women’s roles and reinforces women’s inferior social status; in 
transgender and sexual orientation discrimination cases, courts have begun to protect 
LGBTQ individuals from state demands for conformity to normative stereotypes about how 
to be a man or woman. 
Protecting individuals’ equal dignity can sometimes become complicated when the 
reasons for addressing a group’s purported needs elide individual concerns and attachments. 
For example, the government sometimes relies on normative and statistical information about 
groups to combat group-associated health and poverty risks, to remedy individual disparate 
treatment, and to prevent wholesale group exclusion from opportunities and civic duties. 
Addressing these group-based needs, however, may effectively perpetuate stereotypes about 
what group membership means. Individual group members may object to the identitarian 
implications of the government’s help. 
Not all stereotyping both subordinates a group and denies individuals the liberty to be and 
express who they are. Accordingly, stereotyping is not wrong in and of itself; how the 
government uses stereotypes should determine whether state action violates the Equal 
Protection Clause. Counterintuitively, stereotyping can sometimes promote rather than deny 
equal dignity. While any state reliance on stereotypes risks essentializing identity, an 
absolute stereotyping prohibition exacerbates certain forms of race, sex, and sexual 
orientation blindness. Groups are important, and the government requires some flexibility to 
address group-based needs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the summer of 2015, the Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges1 
struck down all remaining same-sex marriage bans in the United States.2 
Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, reasoning that same-sex 
marriage bans deny “equal dignity” to same-sex couples3 and, by 
extension, to gays and lesbians as a group.4 The Court ultimately held 
that same-sex marriage bans violate individuals’ fundamental right to 
marry as protected under the term “liberty” in the Due Process Clause,5 
                                                     
1. 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  
2. Id. at 2604–05. 
3. Id. at 2608 (petitioners “ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants 
them that right”).  
4. Id. at 2596 (noting that same-sex marriage is one of many “questions about the rights of gays 
and lesbians” to reach the courts). Justice Kennedy unfortunately overlooks bisexuals in his 
analysis. 
5. Id. at 2597–602.  
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as well as the Equal Protection Clause,6 but it acknowledged throughout 
the opinion that the Fourteenth Amendment’s textually separate liberty 
and equality provisions are often conceptually codependent.7 
Obergefell’s focus on dignitary harm and its role at the center of a 
friendly relationship between liberty and equality thus offers important 
guiding principles for understanding the Court’s broader Equal 
Protection jurisprudence. 
One longstanding tenet of Equal Protection law is that the government 
cannot rely on or perpetuate stereotypes when distinguishing between 
and among certain groups.8 In the landmark Reed v. Reed9 decision of 
1971, the Supreme Court gave life to the anti-stereotyping principle 
when it struck down as unconstitutional an Idaho statute that explicitly 
preferred men over women as estate administrators.10 In Reed, the 
ACLU argued in a brief co-authored by now-Justice Ginsburg that 
“legislative judgments have frequently been based on inaccurate 
stereotypes of the capacities and sensibilities of women,”11 and a diverse 
array of laws perpetuate the overarching sex-role stereotype that a 
woman’s place is “subordinate to man.”12 The Court validated these 
arguments throughout the following years and decades, holding 
repeatedly that sex classifications that “ratify and perpetuate invidious, 
archaic, and overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and 
women”13 violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
The anti-stereotyping principle extends beyond sex and applies in 
other contexts in which the government classifies on the basis of a 
suspect status or protected trait. In holding that sexual orientation is a 
suspect classification warranting heightened judicial scrutiny, the Ninth 
Circuit in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories14 recently 
                                                     
6. Id. at 2604–05.  
7. See, e.g., id. at 2603 (“Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may 
rest on different precepts and are not always co-extensive, yet in some instances each may be 
instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other.”).  
8. Professor Cary Franklin argues the anti-stereotyping principle in Equal Protection law as 
originally developed “dictated that the state could not act in ways that reflected or reinforced 
traditional conceptions of men’s and women’s roles.” Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping 
Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 88 (2010).  
9. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).  
10. Id. at 76 (reasoning that a mandatory preference based solely on sex is arbitrary).  
11. Brief for Appellant at 17, Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (No. 70-4).  
12. Id. at 32; see also Franklin, supra note 8, at 122–25 (documenting the history of Justice 
Ginsburg’s involvement in the Reed litigation).  
13. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 131 (1994) (regarding sex-based peremptory 
challenges during jury selection).  
14. 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014).  
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applied the anti-stereotyping principle to a defendant’s peremptive strike 
against a potential juror based in part on his status as gay. The Ninth 
Circuit explained that preemptive strikes based on “preconceived notions 
of the identities, preferences, and biases of gays and lesbians reinforce 
and perpetuate”15 stereotypes, and to revoke a civic responsibility based 
on these stereotypes “demean[s] the dignity of the individual.”16 
What do the anti-stereotyping and equal dignity principles have in 
common? This Article proposes that equal dignity is one theory of Equal 
Protection that can explain when governmental stereotyping is 
unconstitutional.17 The Court’s anti-stereotyping jurisprudence attempts 
to tackle the dual constitutional harms of group subordination and 
individual liberty denial, and Justice Kennedy made both harms central 
to equal dignity’s meaning in Obergefell. First, Kennedy reasoned that, 
when buttressed by the “long history of disapproval” surrounding same-
sex relationships, bans on same-sex marriage impose a “disability on 
gays and lesbians” that “serves to disrespect and subordinate them.”18 
Second, Kennedy explained that equal dignity also requires space for 
individuals, “within a lawful realm, to define and express their 
identity.”19 In other antidiscrimination law contexts, cases that rely on 
the anti-stereotyping principle to strike down classifications based on 
sex, race, and sexual orientation likewise reflect anti-group 
subordination and pro-individual liberty themes. Obergefell simply 
unifies these themes by tying both to a dignitary conception of equality. 
Protecting stigmatized groups from subordination while 
simultaneously providing ample room for individual group members to 
“define and express their identity”20 can sometimes create tension. 
Friction arises when (1) the government acts to address a problem that, 
based on a statistical correlation between some characteristic and group 
membership, disproportionately affects the group; (2) that action 
effectively reinforces or creates ideas about what it means to be a group 
member; and (3) that group meaning conflicts with individual group 
members’ sense of self. In other words, sometimes the government relies 
on normative or statistical information about groups to address a group-
                                                     
15. Id. at 486.  
16. Id. at 485 (emphasis added).  
17. See also Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 17 
(2015) (arguing that “equal dignity” is a prospective concept that informs ongoing constitutional 
conversations about the meaning of equality).  
18. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015).  
19. Id. at 2593.  
20. Id. 
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based problem or alleviate group subordination,21 but doing so risks 
reifying group meanings that diverge from individual conceptions of 
group identity. 
This tension is palpable in anti-stereotyping jurisprudence. On one 
hand, the anti-stereotyping principle typically requires the government to 
treat individuals as individuals. For example, even if most women would 
statistically be unsuited for the Virginia Military Institute’s adversative 
style of learning, the government cannot deny admission to all women 
on that basis.22 On the other hand, sometimes the government must 
address groups as groups. Justice O’Connor’s analysis was arguably 
progressive in Lawrence v. Texas,23 for example, by linking sodomy to 
gays and lesbians as a group when discussing why Texas’s same-sex 
sodomy ban violated the Equal Protection Clause: “[t]he Texas statute 
makes homosexuals unequal in the eyes of the law,” she explained, and 
it “brands all homosexuals as criminals.”24 To ignore this reality would 
have been sexual orientation blind in ways that both subordinated gays 
as a group vis-à-vis straights and denied individuals the liberty to have 
sex with the consenting adult persons of their choosing. Criminalizing 
sodomy had the effect of forbidding individuals from engaging in 
conduct that is important, and often central, to many members of the 
group. Yet not all homosexuals engage in “sodomy,” and many would 
bristle at the assertion that gay identity has anything to do with sex.25 
Pairing sodomy with “all homosexuals” accounts for statistically 
relevant information about gays as a group, but it is also stereotyping. 
Take justifications for affirmative action programs as another 
example. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,26 the UC 
Davis Medical School argued that setting aside sixteen out of 100 
positions in the entering class for racial minorities was necessary to 
achieve its interest in providing health care services to underserved 
minority communities.27 This is a progressive argument, and the Court 
conceded that “[i]t may be correct to assume that some of [the admitted 
minority students] . . . will practice in minority communities.”28 But not 
                                                     
21. See, e.g., Zachary Herz, The Marrying Kind, 83 TENN. L. REV. 83, 147 (2015) (“[R]efusing 
to recognize a group can also be demeaning . . . .”).  
22. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).  
23. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
24. See id. at 581 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
25. See infra section III.B.1.  
26. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
27. See id. at 310.  
28. Id. at 310–11; see also James W. Nickel, Preferential Policies in Hiring and Admissions: A 
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all doctors of color will practice in communities of color,29 and to 
assume that even some will do so invokes group-based assumptions 
rather than individual assessments. 
The tension between liberty and anti-subordination comes into 
sharper relief when we consider the varied and expansive definitions of 
“stereotyping.” Statistical stereotypes, for instance, represent factual 
truths about the conduct, abilities, or lived experiences of most, but not 
all, members of a given group.30 Similarly, normative stereotypes reflect 
informal and largely agreed upon traits, tastes, artifacts, and conduct 
constitutive of group identities.31 Under these and other definitions, 
some scholars have gone so far as to equate stereotypes with culture.32 
But as those who critically study identity have long argued, ignoring 
culture or being blind to it with respect to sex, race, and sexual 
orientation may reinforce group stratification, foster cultural 
appropriation, and otherwise subordinate minorities.33 Thus, we must 
ask, can the government protect vulnerable groups from subordination 
without sometimes stereotyping the individuals who comprise those 
groups? If not, when does government stereotyping amount to a 
constitutional wrong? 
This Article offers two novel contributions to the scholarly literature 
about Equal Protection jurisprudence. First, it argues that not all 
governmental stereotyping amounts to a constitutional violation, or is 
even harmful. How the government uses stereotypes is key. The 
distinction rests on whether the government’s use of stereotypes denies 
equal dignity. Second, this Article explores when stereotyping denies 
equal dignity. It uses Obergefell as the doctrinal anchor and then 
examines the federal judiciary’s prominent anti-stereotyping cases and 
recent developments in LGBTQ antidiscrimination law. This Article 
proposes that governmental stereotyping denies equal dignity and is thus 
                                                     
Jurisprudential Approach, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 534, 542 (1975) (endorsing an assumption 
underlying race-based affirmative action that “blacks who become doctors or lawyers are more 
likely to help meet the medical needs of the black community than whites who become doctors or 
lawyers” (emphasis in original)).  
29. See Miriam Komaromy et al., The Role of Black and Hispanic Physicians in Providing 
Health Care for Underserved Populations, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1305, 1307 (1996) (explaining 
that, based on the results of an empirical study, physicians generally but not universally “practiced 
in areas with relatively high proportions of residents of their own race or ethnic group”).  
30. See K. Anthony Appiah, Stereotypes and the Shaping of Identity, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 41, 47 
(2000).  
31. See id. at 48.  
32. See generally RICHARD T. FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A CRITIQUE (2005).  
33. See infra section III.A.   
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unconstitutional when it has the purpose or effect of (1) subordinating a 
group and (2) unequally denying individuals’ liberty to form and express 
identity. 
This project is motivated in part by a desire to contextualize 
stereotypes and identify their dangers in a more sophisticated rather than 
reactionary way. Group-based experiences and problems are real, but 
legal discourse surrounding stereotypes tends to shift the focus to the 
individual at the expense of groups. One doctrinal solution could be for 
courts to define stereotypes narrowly and in a way that permits the 
government to productively consider normative and statistical 
information that is true of many but not all group members. Another 
solution is to develop a theory for when stereotyping, however defined, 
does not deny dignity. This Article attempts to do the latter. 
This Article focuses primarily on race-, sex-, and sexual orientation-
based stereotyping, but emphasizes stereotyping concerns in LGBTQ 
antidiscrimination law. LGBTQ discrimination cases illustrate especially 
well how the anti-stereotyping principle must guard against both 
individual liberty deprivations and group subordination to achieve 
equality. In some cases, the government discriminates against individual 
gay and transgender people precisely because they are uniquely gender 
non-conforming and fail to match the normative stereotypes associated 
with their biological sex or the social dictates of heterosexuality. In other 
cases, the government discriminates against LGBTQ people as a 
group—usually by relying on false stereotypes and animus to deny 
services or benefits to which many LGBTQ people seek access (e.g., 
marriage), or by criminalizing or punishing conduct closely associated 
with LGBTQ culture and practices (e.g., “sodomy”). 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I fleshes out the constitutional 
meaning of “dignity” based on how the Supreme Court uses it in Equal 
Protection and Substantive Due Process challenges. It then considers 
how the pro-liberty and anti-subordination themes of dignity converge in 
Obergefell, offering a guide for assessing the constitutional harm of 
stereotyping in past and future cases. Part II outlines three distinct 
definitions of stereotypes: false, normative, and statistical. In doing so, it 
explains how all three definitions can deny equal dignity. Part III 
discusses beneficial or “dignified” stereotyping. It first discusses group 
identities, and explores the tension between anti-essentialist and 
multiculturalist concerns. It then discusses dignified stereotyping in an 
LGBTQ context, offering examples for when the government may 
beneficially consider certain normative and statistical information about 
gays as a group: sodomy decriminalization, justifications for affirmative 
action policies, and disparate impact claims. 
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I. DEFINING EQUAL DIGNITY 
Conventional wisdom suggests that, when the government classifies 
on the basis of a quasi-suspect or suspect trait, governmental 
stereotyping is always forbidden. In Orr v. Orr,34 which dealt with the 
constitutionality of an Alabama statute requiring ex-husbands but not ex-
wives to pay spousal support, the Supreme Court famously reasoned that 
“[l]egislative classifications which distribute benefits and burdens on the 
basis of gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing the stereotypes 
about the ‘proper place’ of women and their need for special 
protection.”35 Pursuant to these concerns, the government must engage 
in individualized assessments if feasible when bestowing benefits or 
burdens rather than relying on stereotypes about race or sex.36 This 
individualistic focus is the hallmark of the Court’s current race-
conscious affirmative action jurisprudence.37 
Doctrinally, the anti-stereotyping principle does not apply every time 
the government classifies on the basis of group status;38 instead, it 
applies only when the government classifies on a quasi-suspect or 
suspect class. In those cases, there is a presumably greater need to ensure 
that prejudice about socially salient groups has not infected the decision-
making process.39 Since the end of the notorious Lochner40 era, during 
which the Supreme Court carefully scrutinized and struck down 
                                                     
34. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).  
35. Id. at 283.  
36. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007) 
(noting that courts deploy strict scrutiny when reviewing any state action that “distributes burdens 
or benefits on the basis of individual racial classifications”).  
37. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (race-conscious admissions 
programs require “truly individualized consideration” where race is used in a “flexible, 
nonmechanical way”).  
38. “It is unlikely . . . that any gender classifications based on stereotypes can survive heightened 
scrutiny, but under rational scrutiny, a statute may be defended based on generalized classifications 
unsupported by empirical evidence.” Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 452 (1998) (O’Connor, J., 
joined by Kennedy, J., concurring).  
39. See, e.g., Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1073 (D. Idaho 2014) (“The purpose of this 
heightened level of scrutiny is to ensure quasi-suspect classifications do not perpetuate unfounded 
stereotypes or second-class treatment.”); Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 
1252, 1285 (N.D. Okla. 2014) (“If the discrimination is against a suspect class or quasi-suspect 
class, it comes to courts ‘under grave suspicions and subject to heightened review’ because 
experience teaches that classifications against these groups is ‘so rarely defensible on any ground 
other than a wish to harm and subjugate.’” (quoting SECSYS, LLC v. Vigil, 666 F.3d 678, 687 
(10th Cir. 2012))).  
40. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  
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hundreds of economic regulations,41 the Court has reviewed most 
classifications under a highly deferential rational basis review that 
permits stereotyped reasoning and generalizations.42 In New York City 
Transit Authority v. Beazer,43 for example, the Court determined the 
constitutionality of a government policy that precluded the employment 
of anyone who uses methadone as treatment for heroin addiction, 
regardless of the applicant’s merits or time spent in successful 
treatment.44 The Court rejected an Equal Protection challenge to the 
policy, reasoning that, because the policy did not target “a class of 
persons characterized by some unpopular trait or affiliation,” it was not 
constitutionally significant that generalizations about the whole group of 
methadone users did not apply to all methadone users.45 Governmental 
reliance on stereotypes is thus permissible more often than not. 
The Supreme Court’s willingness to accept stereotyping in some 
contexts but not others is a frequent fixture of Equal Protection law. In 
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,46 the Court held that state actors may not 
strike potential jurors based solely on sex.47 To do so would perpetuate 
stereotypes about men and women.48 But the Court noted in J.E.B. that 
preliminary juror strikes based on membership in other groups do not 
pose constitutional problems, even if those strikes rely on stereotypes 
about group membership.49 
The popular refrain is that all peremptory challenges are based 
on stereotypes of some kind, expressing various intuitive and 
frequently erroneous biases. But where peremptory challenges 
are made on the basis of group characteristics other than race or 
gender (like occupation, for example), they do not reinforce the 
                                                     
41. See, e.g., id. at 64 (striking down a statute limiting the number of hours that bakers could 
work per week); Erwin Chemerinsky, Under the Bridges of Paris: Economic Liberties Should Not 
Be Just for the Rich, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 31, 34 (2003) (in the Lochner era, “the Supreme Court 
repeatedly invalidated statutes that were enacted to help workers and consumers”).  
42. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (ending searching 
judicial review of economic legislation under the Due Process Clause, but reserving searching 
judicial review for legislation affecting the Bill of Rights, the political process, and discrete and 
insular minorities); Barry Cushman, Carolene Products and Constitutional Structure, 2012 SUP. CT. 
REV. 321, 321–22 (discussing same). 
43. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).  
44. Id. at 576–77.  
45. Id. at 593.  
46. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).  
47. Id. at 146.  
48. Id. at 131.  
49. Id. at 142 n.14.  
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same stereotypes about the group’s competence or 
predispositions that have been used to prevent them from voting, 
participating on juries, pursuing their chosen professions, or 
otherwise contributing to civic life.50 
The Court’s distinction in J.E.B. for when stereotyping is and is not 
harmful gets squarely at one of the two pillars of equal dignity: a 
commitment to counter the subordination of socially salient and 
oppressed groups. The other pillar functions to protect individuals’ 
liberty to define and express identity. 
Going forward, this Article examines how the Court invokes dignity 
under the Substantive Due Process Clause to protect decisional 
autonomy regarding identity and notions of self. It then examines how 
the Court invokes dignity under the Equal Protection Clause to protect 
oppressed groups from subordination. It also discusses how the Court in 
Obergefell ties these pro-liberty and anti-subordination threads together 
to strike down same-sex marriage bans as violating the equal dignity 
principle at the center of the Equal Protection Clause. Finally, it 
illustrates how equal dignity likewise animates the Equal Protection 
Clause’s anti-stereotyping doctrine. 
A. Liberty as Individual Decisional Autonomy 
In modern times, the Supreme Court emphasizes dignity as an 
important constitutional consideration in both Substantive Due Process 
and Equal Protection jurisprudence.51 As Reva Siegel explains, 
“constitutional protections for dignity vindicate, often concurrently, the 
value of life, the value of liberty, and the value of equality.”52 
Early Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection cases in which 
the Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment’s liberty guarantee 
hinged to a large degree on governmental respect for individual 
autonomy as a necessary means to promote human dignity. In Eisenstadt 
v. Baird,53 for example, the Court held that states cannot prohibit 
individuals from purchasing contraceptives because, if “the right of 
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual . . . to be free 
                                                     
50. Id. (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).  
51. See, e.g., Noa Ben-Asher, Conferring Dignity: The Metamorphosis of the Legal Homosexual, 
37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 243, 276 (2014) (noting that “dignity” has been “especially prominent in 
decisions authored by Justice Kennedy”).  
52. Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Procreation: Abortion Restrictions Under 
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1736 (2008).  
53. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).  
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from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally 
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”54 
Moreover, the Eisenstadt Court anchored its analysis in the Equal 
Protection Clause, explaining that the government cannot unequally 
deny individuals the liberty to exercise a fundamental right to make such 
deeply personal decisions.55 The Court soon extended this decisional 
autonomy conception of liberty to the abortion context, reasoning that 
“few decisions are ‘more basic to individual dignity and autonomy’ or 
more appropriate to that ‘certain private sphere of individual liberty’ that 
the Constitution reserves from the intrusive reach of government than 
the right to make the uniquely personal, intimate, and self-defining 
decision whether to end a pregnancy.”56 
The Court’s fundamental rights jurisprudence firmly establishes that 
constitutionally protected liberty encompasses the autonomy to make 
certain decisions because those choices are central to individual dignity. 
This liberty also includes, among other things, the right to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment so that individuals may “die with 
dignity,”57 and the right to privately express sexuality with another 
person so that individuals may “retain their dignity as free persons.”58 
The right to make personal decisions about with whom we have sex, the 
composition of our families, and how our life will end fundamentally 
affects our identities and the kinds of existence we lead.59 Dignity 
requires that we acknowledge human beings as autonomous agents who 
make self-defining choices.60 
                                                     
54. Id. at 453 (emphasis omitted).  
55. Id. at 453–55.  
56. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 548–49 (1989) (quoting Thornburgh v. Am. 
Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986)); see also Planned Parenthood of 
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (reasoning that the “most intimate and personal choices” 
that a person makes are “central to personal dignity and autonomy” and are thus central to liberty).  
57. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 301 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 678 (Ariz. 1987) (en banc)). But see Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 716, 735–36 (1997) (holding that Washington’s ban on physician-
assisted suicide does not violate the liberty guaranteed by the substantive due process, in part 
because of disagreements over how best to protect “dignity and independence at the end of life”). 
58. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).  
59. Sometimes, however, the Court’s use of dignity has frustrated progressive goals, particularly 
when it perceives the values of individual liberty and life as in conflict. See, e.g., Gonzales v. 
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 156–57 (2007) (upholding the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 
2003, reasoning that the government has a legitimate interest in promoting “respect for the dignity 
of human life”).  
60. See BENJAMIN EIDELSON, DISCRIMINATION AND DISRESPECT 138–39, 150 (2015) 
(theorizing that discrimination rooted in stereotypes is troubling because it disregards the standing 
of individuals as autonomous agents who make unique choices about how to live their lives).  
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B. Equality as Anti-Group Subordination 
The Court has also invoked dignity as a rationale for why dissimilar 
treatment of similarly situated groups is a constitutional wrong. A recent 
high-profile example comes from United States v. Windsor.61 There, the 
Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional under the Fifth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause a provision of the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA) that defined marriage under all federal laws as 
solely between one man and one woman.62 The Court devoted 
significant time to a discussion about the respect, honor, and social 
standing63 that both the government and society ascribe to marriage.64 
Because marriage is a positive right to which governmental benefits and 
responsibilities attach, the Court conceptualized the government’s role in 
determining who can obtain those rights and responsibilities as 
conferring “a dignity and status of immense import.”65 Focusing in large 
part on evidence of the government’s antigay animus, the Court 
determined that DOMA’s “essence” was to interfere with the “equal 
dignity” that some states had conferred on same-sex and different-sex 
couples alike by legalizing same-sex marriage.66 DOMA’s principle 
effect, the Court found, was to single out one group—individuals in 
state-sanctioned same-sex marriages—and make them unequal to 
individuals in different-sex marriages, which “demeans” gay and 
bisexual couples.67 
The Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education68 is another 
poignant example of an equality case in which dignity played a role. In 
Brown, the Court unanimously held that public secondary schools 
cannot constitutionally operate on a formal racially segregated basis.69 
As Ian Haney-López explains, the Warren Court did not search for 
discriminatory governmental intent in civil rights cases but instead found 
                                                     
61. 570 U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  
62. Id. at 2683.  
63. See Siegel, supra note 52, at 1739 (identifying these attributes as dignitary concerns when 
equality is implicated by governmental action that deals with individuals as members of the body 
politic).  
64. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691–96.  
65. Id. at 2681. For a strong critique of the Court’s decision to conceive of dignity as sometimes 
emanating from the State rather than as an inherent part of the respect that the State owes to 
individuals, see generally Ben-Asher, supra note 51.  
66. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.  
67. Id. at 2694.  
68. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
69. Id. at 495.  
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Equal Protection violations based primarily on the impact of the 
challenged governmental action.70 In Brown, the Court anchored its 
analysis on the effects that segregation has on Black71 schoolchildren: 
“[t]o separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely 
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in 
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely 
ever to be undone.”72 
The Brown Court never explicitly draws on “dignity” as an equality 
component, but its focus on state-sanctioned inferiority and subordinate 
status of Blacks vis-à-vis whites provides an early template for the 
constitutional relevance of equal dignity as a theory of Equal Protection 
in future cases.73 Group subordination on the basis of socially salient 
status denies opportunities in both tangible (e.g., exclusion from a 
quality education) and intangible (e.g., feelings of inferiority) ways. 
Notably, the Court has never outlined a test or even a unifying theory 
of when state action subordinates a group. Professor Siegel notes that, 
while many scholars agree that anti-subordination is central to equal 
dignity’s guarantee, there is little consensus around what practices 
subordinate and why.74 Accordingly, this Article does not purport to 
create a test or rule for what subordination means and looks like in all 
contexts. Based on respected scholarly thought and Supreme Court 
analysis, however, governmental action that creates group hierarchies is 
                                                     
70. Ian Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1798–802 (2012). 
Professor Haney-López identifies the Burger Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence from the 1970s 
as the genesis of the Court’s now rigid focus on discriminatory intent over impact. Id.  
71. Like many critical race theorists, I use an uppercase “B” when discussing “Blacks” as a 
group. Kimberlé Crenshaw explains her decision to use an uppercase “B” in the following way: 
“[w]hen using ‘Black,’ I shall use an upper-case ‘B’ to reflect my view that Blacks, like Asians, 
Latinos, and other ‘minorities,’ constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, require denotation 
as a proper noun.” Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation 
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988) (emphasis 
in original). Other scholars capitalize both “White” and “Black” to, for example, “emphasize that 
‘Whiteness’ is itself a social construct and not a natural phenomenon.” Robert S. Chang & Adrienne 
D. Davis, The Adventure(s) of Blackness in Western Culture: An Epistolary Exchange on Old and 
New Identity Wars, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1189, 1191 n.4 (2006). While there are good reasons for 
capitalizing both “White” and “Black,” I hesitate to do so and risk fueling claims that whites 
constitute a specific identitarian-based group, particularly at this historical moment in which white 
supremacist sentiment appears to be on the rise. 
72. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.  
73. See generally Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court, 2012 Term—Foreword, Equality Divided, 
127 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2013) (noting the similarities between the Court’s analysis in Windsor and 
Brown, and specifically the Court’s attention to meaning and impact of laws as judged from the 
perspective of historically subordinated groups).  
74. Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness” Discourse 
Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 77, 87, 115–16 (2000).  
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one critical feature of subordination. In other words, at the very least, the 
government subordinates when it acts with either the purpose or effect of 
disfavoring one similarly situated group over another, thus creating or 
reinforcing existing social hierarchies that tell outgroup members that 
they are inferior.75 
Even this basic definition of subordination is complicated somewhat 
by the reality of intersectionality.76 Kimberlé Crenshaw first coined 
intersectionality as a theory to explain how individuals invariably have 
multiple identities that overlap and trigger unique experiences of 
oppression, thus creating seemingly infinite subgroups that may 
experience oppression differently depending on context.77 Nevertheless, 
it is possible to discern a subordinating purpose or effect even at the 
subgroup level without always privileging dominant configurations of 
group identity. Defining subordination as, at bare minimum, government 
action that disfavors a (sub)group should focus the analysis. 
C. Equal Dignity as Individual Decisional Autonomy and Anti-Group 
Subordination 
In sum, the Supreme Court’s Equal Protection and Substantive Due 
Process jurisprudence weave two prominent strains of dignity: one pro-
liberty and the other anti-subordination. As Kenji Yoshino notes, 
however, these two dignitary strains are not always distinct, and in fact 
                                                     
75. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1007–10 (1986) (explaining that subordination at root is about domination, 
power differences, and hierarchies between groups); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution 
Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2–5 (1991) (equating racial subordination with racial 
hierarchy and domination that implies “racial inferiority,” specifically focusing on “the social, 
economic, and political advantages that whites hold over other Americans”); Cornelia T.L. Pillard, 
Our Other Reproductive Choices: Equality in Sex Education, Contraceptive Access, and Work-
Family Policy, 56 EMORY L.J. 941, 949 (2007) (explaining that equal protection values, and 
specifically anti-stereotyping principles, oppose systemic gender hierarchies); Francisco Valdes, 
Beyond Sexual Orientation in Queer Legal Theory: Majoritarianism, Multidimensionality, and 
Responsibility in Social Justice Scholarship or Legal Scholars as Cultural Warriors, 75 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 1409, 1415 (1998) (noting the interconnected nature of subordination by reminding “all 
outgroups that all forms of identity hierarchy impinge on the social and legal interests of their 
members” (emphasis in original)). 
76. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 139, 140 (1989) (critiquing “dominant conceptions of discrimination” that “condition us 
to think about subordination as disadvantage occurring along a single categorical axis”).   
77. Id. at 150–52; see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: “Intersectionality,” 
“Multidimensionality,” and the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 285, 312–13 (2001) (discussing as one example how the experiences of lesbians of color 
will differ from the experiences of white lesbians).   
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they often converge.78 This link is starkly apparent in the Supreme 
Court’s Obergefell decision of 2015. 
In Obergefell, the Court considered the constitutionality of state laws 
that define marriage as between one man and one woman.79 This 
litigation capped a stunning series of victories in which LGBTQ 
plaintiffs won twenty-six of twenty-nine federal challenges to same-sex 
marriage bans in the two years following the Supreme Court’s Windsor 
decision striking down DOMA.80 The historical context leading to 
Obergefell is lengthy, fraught, and seminal in the fight for LGBTQ 
liberation and equality. Long before any federal court victories, 
however, in the immediate wake of the 1969 Stonewall riots, a handful 
of rogue same-sex couples formally began the legal movement for same-
sex marriage.81 These brave women and men sought and were denied 
marriage licenses in a far less tolerant climate than today’s, and in an era 
in which formal legal service organizations and many of the LGBTQ 
community’s own members were hesitant to endorse same-sex marriage 
as a worthy political and legal goal.82 Same-sex marriage advocates did 
not score a formal legal victory until 1993, when the Hawaii Supreme 
Court held as colorable a claim that same-sex marriage bans may 
constitute sex discrimination under the Hawaii Constitution.83 It is these 
early pioneer plaintiffs and their attorneys who paved the way for the 
Court’s decision in Obergefell, handed down forty-six years after 
Stonewall. 
Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in Obergefell, and the 
two dignitary pillars of pro-individual liberty and anti-group 
subordination guide his analysis. With respect to anti-subordination, 
Kennedy begins by outlining the legal and social history of the 
institution of marriage as traditionally reserved for one man and one 
                                                     
78. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 749 (2011) (noting that 
courts and scholars often place too much emphasis on a formal distinction between equality and 
liberty claims, and that dignity “acknowledges the links” between the two concepts).  
79. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015) (petitioners challenged 
laws in Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee).   
80. Tom Watts, From Windsor to Obergefell: The Struggle for Marriage Equality Continued, 9 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE S52, S71–S72 (2015). 
81. See generally Michael Boucai, Glorious Precedents: When Gay Marriage Was Radical, 27 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2015).  
82. Professor Michael Boucai beautifully chronicles the events and personal stories that led to 
the first U.S. court cases regarding the constitutionality of laws that limit the definition of marriage 
to one man and one woman. See id. at 22–54.  
83. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993), abrogated by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584.  
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woman.84 Echoing Windsor’s analytical themes, Kennedy explains that 
marriage—and, by implication, a government that grants a marriage 
license and its attendant benefits and responsibilities—confers “nobility 
and dignity to all persons, without regard to their station in life.”85 From 
there, Kennedy shifts his focus to what message governments send to 
individuals who cannot lawfully marry a same-sex partner, but for whom 
“their immutable nature dictates that same-sex marriage is their only real 
path to this profound commitment.”86 Against a long and hostile 
backdrop of social and state-sponsored discrimination against LGBTQ 
people, Justice Kennedy reasons that same-sex marriage bans have “the 
effect,” if not the purpose, “of teaching that gays and lesbians are 
unequal in important respects.”87 In unambiguous terms, Justice 
Kennedy characterizes this formal inequality as “subordinat[ion].”88 
Same-sex marriage bans are a poignant example of how the 
government can unconstitutionally deny equal dignity. These laws by 
design confer benefits to one group (heterosexuals) that they withhold 
from another similarly situated group (lesbians, gays, and bisexuals), 
strongly signaling the government’s distaste for the latter group. Justice 
Kennedy was wise to forego a searching inquiry into whether antigay 
intent may have motivated this dissimilar treatment because, frankly, 
sex-differentiated marriage has existed “for millennia and across 
civilizations”89 and long before society’s recognition of homosexuals 
and bisexuals as a distinct social group.90 Nevertheless, after lesbians, 
gays, and bisexuals came into political consciousness and sought equal 
treatment, both old and new restrictive marriage laws conveyed the 
unmistakable message that same-sex sexuality is inferior to 
heterosexuality. 
The government’s strong preference for heterosexuality over 
homosexuality is well documented given its overt discrimination in 
employment,91 military service,92 and child custody and visitation 
                                                     
84. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594. 
85. Id.  
86. Id.  
87. Id. at 2602.  
88. Id. at 2604.  
89. Id. at 2594.  
90. See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, 
Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 934 (1989) (explaining that the concept of 
homosexuality as “a fixed propensity that fundamentally characterizes individuals who desire or 
participate in homosexual acts” did not emerge in western culture until the late nineteenth century).  
91. See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1099 (11th Cir. 1997) (ruling that the Georgia 
Attorney General’s office did not violate the Equal Protection Clause when it revoked a woman’s 
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disputes.93 These forms of subordination keep queer people in their 
hierarchical place. In a different historical time and context, the 
government somewhat similarly94 marked Blacks as inferior to whites 
through interracial marriage bans.95 Consider also the governmental 
subordination that prohibited women from practicing law96 and other 
professions,97 thereby keeping women in the socially undervalued 
domestic sphere and men in the socially respected marketplace of ideas. 
Beyond formally extending benefits to similarly situated groups on an 
equal basis, Justice Kennedy explains that equal dignity also means that 
all persons have the equal liberty “to define and express their identity”98 
free from governmental subordination of a socially salient group to 
which they belong. This powerful identity-affirming language appears in 
the very first line of Obergefell,99 and it offers an expansive vision of 
both the liberty and equality guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. It weds 
the Court’s decisional autonomy and anti-subordination analyses in one 
equal dignity partnership. 
                                                     
offer of employment after it found out that she was a lesbian).   
92. National Defense Authorization (Don’t Ask Don’t Tell) Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. 
No. 103-160, § 571, 107 Stat. 1574 (repealed 2010) (prohibiting openly gay and bisexual men and 
women from serving in the military).  
93. See Clifford J. Rosky, Fear of the Queer Child, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 607, 652–55 (2013) 
(discussing courts’ preference that children have “heterosexual role models” in disputes between 
straight and sexual-minority parents).  
94. Interracial and same-sex marriage bans, while similar in practical effect on those who seek to 
enter such relationships, are not perfectly analogous examples of governmental subordination due to 
the different ways in which race and sexual orientation manifest in individuals’ lives and as tools of 
social and legal balkanization. For a thorough critique of the race analogies that often surface in pro-
LGBTQ legal strategizing, see generally Catherine Smith, Queer as Black Folk?, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 
379.  
95. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (“The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial 
marriages involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their 
own justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.”).  
96. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 131 (1872) (holding that an Illinois law barring women 
from the practice of law does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment). “That God designed the sexes 
to occupy different spheres of action, and that it belonged to men to make, apply, and execute the 
laws, was regarded as an almost axiomatic truth.” Id. at 132.  
97. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465 (1948) (holding that a Michigan law barring 
women from holding bartending licenses “unless she be ‘the wife or daughter of the male owner’ of 
a licensed liquor establishment” does not violate the Equal Protection Clause), abrogated by Craig 
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). “Michigan evidently believes that the oversight assured through 
ownership of a bar by a barmaid’s husband or father minimizes hazards that may confront a barmaid 
without such protecting oversight. This Court is certainly not in a position to gainsay such belief by 
the Michigan legislature.” Id. at 466.  
98. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015). 
99. Id. 
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In the specific context of same-sex marriage bans, this form of 
governmental subordination unequally denies LGBTQ individuals the 
liberty to form and express identities around their sexual orientation, 
simply because the government finds same-sex relationships to be 
inferior. Douglas NeJaime explains that “[s]exual orientation by its very 
nature includes an active, relational component. Sexual orientation 
identity is linked to (both actual and contemplated) relationships with 
other bodies.”100 For some, then, “[e]ntering, performing, and publicly 
showing a same-sex relationship serves as a central way of embracing 
and maintaining one’s lesbian or gay identity.”101 
Because governments typically favor heterosexuality, state actions 
actively promote possibilities and provide room for straight individuals 
to form identities around their sexual orientation, which, for many, 
requires a public and state-recognized marriage to a different-sex 
partner. Prohibiting this identity-affirming activity and denying formal 
relational status to LGB people as a group impedes individual liberty on 
an unequal and subordinating basis, and, therefore, violates the dignitary 
foundation underlying the Equal Protection Clause. 
Decisional autonomy has long been a feature of the Supreme Court’s 
Substantive Due Process jurisprudence. But never before Obergefell had 
the Court so clearly connected choices about identity to liberty,102 and 
never had equality so clearly included the liberty to express identity free 
from government subordination on the basis of group status.103 
Moreover, Obergefell connects equality to a long line of decisional 
privacy cases104 under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Substantive Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses in which the Court protected 
individuals’ rights to not conform105 to prevailing social norms and 
mores.106 Obergefell makes clear that the government can no longer 
                                                     
100. Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemptions, 
and the Production of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1197–98 
(2012).  
101. Id. at 1199 (emphasis added).  
102. See, e.g., Julie A. Nice, Conjuring “Equal Dignity”: Mapping the Constitutional Dialogue 
to and from Same-Sex Marriage, in 31 NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION AND 
ATTORNEY FEES ANNUAL HANDBOOK 376 (Steven Saltzman ed., 2015) (finding it particularly 
noteworthy that Justice Kennedy “treated identity as an inherent aspect of liberty”).  
103. Professor Kenji Yoshino calls this aspect of equal dignity “antisubordination liberty.” Kenji 
Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 174 (2015).  
104. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (striking down Texas’s sodomy ban 
because it infringes on adults’ liberty to have consensual sex in their own homes if they so choose).  
105. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that “liberty” must include “the freedom not to conform”).  
106. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015). 
04 - Boso.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2017  9:44 AM 
2017] DIGNITY, INEQUALITY, AND STEREOTYPES 1137 
 
enact policies that unequally deny individuals the liberty to engage in 
identity-constitutive conduct if the government’s purpose or effect is to 
validate social perceptions about lesbian, gay, and bisexual group 
inferiority.107 Laurence Tribe predicts that Obergefell’s real promise 
extends “beyond same-sex couples to ensure that all individuals are 
protected against the specter of coerced conformity.”108 
D. Anti-Stereotyping as Equal Dignity 
The Supreme Court’s Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process 
jurisprudence, and the convergence of anti-subordination and pro-liberty 
principles at the heart of Obergefell’s equal dignity command, explain 
the harms of stereotyping and why it is constitutionally forbidden with 
respect to historically marginalized groups.109 Regarding sex 
classifications, the Supreme Court since the 1970s has reasoned that the 
government cannot act with either the purpose or effect of perpetuating 
stereotyped views about men and women.110 An examination of some of 
the federal judiciary’s key anti-stereotyping cases reveals that courts 
have long been skeptical of stereotyped thinking precisely because it 
carries the dual risks of group subordination and unequal individual 
liberty deprivation. 
Traditionally, courts most often invoke the anti-stereotyping doctrine 
to preclude overt forms of group subordination through exclusionary 
state action. When the government categorically treats men and women 
differently or excludes women outright from certain civic functions, 
governmental reliance on sex stereotypes reinforces a sex hierarchy with 
men on top, buttressing women’s perceived status as inferior.111 Noa 
Ben-Asher argues that courts tend to forbid sex stereotyping only when 
it reinforces sex hierarchies, and particularly when it limits women’s 
economic opportunities and men’s domestic opportunities.112 Anti-
                                                     
107. See id. at 2604. 
108. Tribe, supra note 17, at 30 (emphasis in original). 
109. See infra notes 243–50 and accompanying text (discussing J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 
511 U.S. 127 (1994)).  
110. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729–30 (1982).  
111. See, e.g., Stephanie Bornstein, The Law of Gender Stereotyping and the Work-Family 
Conflicts of Men, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1297, 1301–12 (2012) (discussing the Burger Court’s resistance 
to stereotypes in Equal Protection claims due to its propensity to role-cast men and women in ways 
that deny opportunities to women).  
112. See generally Noa Ben-Asher, The Two Laws of Sex Stereotyping, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1187 
(2016).  
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subordination is indeed a core pillar of equal dignity, but it does not act 
alone. 
Modern courts are increasingly reasoning that plaintiffs can bring 
discrimination claims when evidence suggests that a decision-maker 
treated the plaintiff differently due to his or her failure to conform to 
norms about appropriate gendered behavior.113 These courts are both 
guarding against status degradation and protecting individual identity 
choices. On one hand, modern anti-stereotyping decisions promote anti-
subordination principles by freeing individuals from assigned roles that 
implicate the inferior or dominant status of the group to which they or 
others belong. On the other hand, these decisions also promote liberty by 
guarding individuals’ freedom to form and express identities without the 
government’s weighty hand dictating their behavioral and identitarian 
gender choices. Accordingly, anti-stereotyping at root is about protecting 
the equal dignity of every individual. 
For example, in a 2017 case, Sessions v. Morales-Santana,114 the 
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a sex-based immigration law 
that dictates the circumstances in which a child who is born abroad may 
acquire U.S. citizenship if one parent is not a U.S. citizen.115 The statute 
treats U.S. citizen mothers more favorably than U.S. citizen fathers,116 
and the Court reasoned that this differential treatment is rooted in 
stereotypical assumptions about fathers’ relatively loose relationships 
with their children as compared to mothers, and mothers’ traditional role 
as child caretakers.117 Concluding its Equal Protection analysis, the 
Court explained that, because sex stereotypes undergird the disparate 
treatment of mothers and fathers, the statute violates the constitutional 
                                                     
113. See, e.g., Deneffe v. Skywest Inc., No. 14-cv-00348-MEH, 2015 WL 2265373, at *6 (D. 
Colo. May 11, 2015) (permitting plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim to go forward under Title VII 
based on allegations that plaintiff’s homosexuality did not conform to his co-workers’ expectations 
of masculinity); EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 3d 594, 595 (E.D. 
Mich. 2015) (permitting plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim to go forward under Title VII based on 
allegations that plaintiff’s transgender status and gender transition did not conform to her co-
workers’ expectations of how a biological male should act).  
114. __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017).  
115. Id. at 1686. 
116. The acquisition of citizenship differs significantly depending on whether the child’s father 
or mother is a U.S. citizen, making it much easier for the child’s mother to confer citizenship. The 
statute “requires a period of physical presence in the United States for the U.S.-citizen parent,” and, 
“currently, the requirement is five years prebirth.” Id. Congress created an exception for unwed 
U.S.-citizen mothers, allowing an “unwed mother to transmit her citizenship to a child born abroad 
if she has lived in the United States for just one year prior to the child’s birth.” Id.  
117. Id. at 1692.  
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requirement that the government “respect the equal dignity and stature of 
its male and female citizens.”118 
If governmental stereotyping has the purpose or effect of 
subordinating an oppressed group and unequally denying individual 
group members the liberty to form and express their identities, it violates 
the Equal Protection Clause. It is important at this point to note that both 
pillars of equal dignity stand together. Protecting individual liberty 
presumably allows people to express their identities free of 
governmentally prescribed norms and roles. Without the anti-
subordination component, however, individuals might claim that their 
identity expression requires the subordination of others. 
Contemporary debates over religious freedom offer a cautionary 
analogy. Today, religious individuals and businesses increasingly argue 
that antidiscrimination laws protecting LGBTQ individuals and 
women’s reproductive choices infringe on religious liberty.119 Courts 
that accept these claims effectively permit individuals’ religious liberty 
to trump equality principles. When the government exempts religious 
individuals from antidiscrimination laws, permitting denials of services 
or accommodations to certain people, this sends a subordinating message 
to those excluded: these “are actions that address third parties as sinners 
in ways that can stigmatize and demean.”120 To avoid this problem under 
an equal dignity theory of Equal Protection, the government may burden 
individuals’ identity expression as long as it does not also subordinate a 
historically oppressed group. In practice, the anti-subordination pillar 
may do most of the analytical work given that any practice that 
subordinates a historically oppressed group also likely denies individual 
group members the ability to express their identities on their own terms. 
Still, if the government acts in reliance on statistically relevant 
information about a historically oppressed group, does that action always 
both unequally deny individual identity expression and send a 
subordinating message about group status? Can the government 
progressively account for factual information about groups to address 
group-specific problems, even if the group-based information on which 
the government relies has the effect of conveying a message about the 
group that conflicts with individual group members’ sense of identity 
                                                     
118. Id. at 1698 (emphasis added).  
119. For a rigorous discussion of the conservative movement’s legal strategy to oppose LGBTQ 
rights under statutory religious freedom laws, see Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience 
Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2558–65 
(2015).  
120. Id. at 2576. 
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and self? To answer these questions, it is crucial to first determine what 
the term “stereotyping” in the anti-stereotyping principle means. The 
following analysis examines three different versions of stereotypes: 
false, normative, and statistical. As this analysis shows, “stereotyping” 
can be construed so broadly as to encompass governmental application 
of even statistically relevant group-based information. 
II. DEFINING STEREOTYPES 
What does it mean to call something a stereotype? Since at least the 
1960s, the Supreme Court has excoriated state actors in Equal Protection 
cases when the purpose or effect of state action is to reinforce 
stereotypes about certain groups of people. In Mississippi University for 
Women v. Hogan,121 the Court ruled that a state-sponsored nursing 
school’s female-only enrollment policy was unconstitutional because it 
“tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively 
woman’s job.”122 In statutory civil rights laws, like Title VII and Title 
IX, the federal judiciary has been similarly adamant that individuals 
should not suffer disparate treatment because they fail to conform to 
stereotypes associated with a group to which they belong. The most 
famous judicial decree under Title VII against stereotyping came in 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,123 where the Court proclaimed that “we 
are beyond the day when an employer [can] evaluate employees by 
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with 
their group.”124 
The Supreme Court has focused on the evils of stereotyping in a wide 
range of antidiscrimination contexts, including in race-based affirmative 
action policies, in peremptive juror strikes, and in policies affecting 
domestic relations between men and women. Yet despite a robust body 
of jurisprudence warning against stereotyping as a motivation for or 
effect of state and private action, the Court has never precisely defined 
the word “stereotype.”125 
                                                     
121. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).  
122. Id. at 729.  
123. 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(m) (2012). 
124. Id. at 251. 
125. See Roger Craig Green, Case Note, Equal Protection and the Status of Stereotypes, 108 
YALE L.J. 1885, 1886 n.10 (1999) (“The Supreme Court has never defined what constitutes a 
stereotype; nor has it explained how stereotypes differ from other, non-invidious generalizations.”).  
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To stereotype often involves a reflexive rather than thoughtful 
intellectual process. In that vein, the Supreme Court once characterized 
stereotyping as “a frame of mind resulting from irrational or uncritical 
analysis.”126 An irrational or uncritical analysis is one that ignores or 
downplays evidence in favor of generalizations as a mental shortcut.127 
As Jerry Kang explains, “a stereotype is an association between a social 
group and a specific trait”128 where “the correlation between social 
group and trait is far from perfect.”129 
In a sense, however, these mental shortcuts are unavoidable, which in 
part explains why courts have been remiss to condemn them altogether. 
Linda Hamilton Krieger explains that stereotypes are “cognitive 
mechanisms that all people, not just ‘prejudiced’ ones, use to simplify 
the task of perceiving, processing, and retaining information about 
people in memory. They are central, and indeed essential, to normal 
cognitive functioning.”130 Charles Lawrence offers a similar depiction of 
stereotyping as a normal human sorting device, and identifies the 
moment at which this device causes harm as when the stereotyped 
thinking “eschews reality even when facts are available.”131 
Not all stereotypes are born of reflexive and unthinking impulses. To 
the contrary, many stereotypes are based on available facts. In her 
dissenting opinion in Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S.,132 Justice O’Connor 
summarized much of the Court’s anti-stereotyping jurisprudence, 
explaining: “[t]his Court has long recognized . . . that an impermissible 
stereotype may enjoy empirical support and thus be in a sense 
‘rational.’”133 O’Connor then cites for support the following language 
from J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.: “[w]e have made abundantly clear 
in past cases that gender classifications that rest on impermissible 
stereotypes violate the Equal Protection Clause, even when some 
statistical support can be conjured up for the generalization.”134 For 
                                                     
126. Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 68 (2001).  
127. See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1228 (2012). 
128. Jerry Kang, Rethinking Intent and Impact: Some Behavioral Realism About Equal 
Protection, 66 ALA. L. REV. 627, 628 (2015) (emphasis omitted).  
129. Kang et al., supra note 127, at 1228 n.9. 
130. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1188 (1995) 
(emphasis in original). 
131. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 333 (1987).  
132. 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
133. Id. at 89 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
134. Id. (quoting J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.11 (1994)).  
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Justice O’Connor and her dissenting colleagues, a stereotype can be 
false and therefore irrational, or statistically informed and therefore 
rational. Both kinds of stereotyping may pose constitutional problems, 
however, because attention to individuals and context may lead to more 
accurate and less overbroad results.135 
This Article proposes that the crux of stereotyping, false and true 
alike, is a focus on groups over individuals. Focusing on groups 
inevitably means ignoring or downplaying available evidence about an 
individual’s traits, capabilities, and perspectives, while giving greater or 
definitive weight to group-based generalizations. While this Article’s 
primary focus is on the Equal Protection Clause, courts’ analysis and the 
animating principles of equality and disparate treatment are substantially 
similar under both the Constitution and statutory antidiscrimination 
laws.136 Accordingly, this Article uses both Equal Protection and Title 
VII case law to illustrate the mechanics and harms of stereotyping as 
defined in three different ways. 
A. False Stereotyping 
Anthony Appiah suggests that at least three different versions of 
stereotyping can operate in law: false, normative, and statistical. First 
and most straightforwardly is false stereotyping, which includes “a false 
belief about a group.”137 In antidiscrimination law, false stereotyping 
occurs when an actor takes some action because of an incorrect belief 
that an individual possesses a group characteristic that is not actually 
common to the group.138 Even if some members of the group possess 
that characteristic, the actor’s association is still a false stereotype if 
these group members are no more likely than anyone else to possess the 
characteristic.139 It is easy to see why false stereotyping is harmful, 
particularly when false stereotypes are unambiguously negative. No 
individual should be subordinated or denied liberty due to baseless 
generalizations about their group membership. 
A common example in the LGBTQ context is the false stereotype that 
LGBTQ people, and especially gay men, are pedophiles. In same-sex 
marriage litigation, states and amici curiae argued that the government 
                                                     
135. See id. at 90 (citing Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 460 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).  
136. See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court 
Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 285 (1997).  
137. Appiah, supra note 30, at 48.  
138. Id.  
139. Id.  
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has a legitimate and even compelling interest in prohibiting same-sex 
marriage because gays and lesbians are more likely to molest children.140 
Gay and lesbian state employees have been harassed at work by co-
workers who equate homosexuality with pedophilia.141 The Boy Scouts 
of America once prohibited gay men from holding positions as scout 
leaders, implicitly relying on legal arguments about “the sinister and 
unspoken fear that gay scout leaders will somehow cause physical or 
emotional injury to scouts.”142 State court judges have denied gays and 
lesbians custody and visitation rights to their children because of the 
assumption that they will engage in sexual abuse;143 as three judges on a 
Missouri Court of Appeals put it, “[e]very trial judge, or for that matter, 
every appellate judge, knows that the molestation of minor boys” by gay 
men is not uncommon.144 Florida enacted and later justified its ban on 
same-sex adoptions with thinly veiled references to the false link 
between child molestation and homosexuality.145 
In the famous civil trial over the constitutionality of California’s 
Proposition 8, which prohibited same-sex marriage by ballot 
referendum, Judge Vaughn Walker noted that “stereotypes imagine gay 
men and lesbians as disease vectors or as child molesters who recruit 
young children into homosexuality.”146 After reviewing extensive 
testimony from dozens of credible witnesses and scientific studies, Judge 
Walker concluded, “[n]o evidence supports these stereotypes.”147 
                                                     
140. See, e.g., Anderson v. King Cty., 158 Wash. 2d 1, 114 n.14, 138 P.3d 963, 1036 n.14 
(2006) (en banc) (Bridge, J., dissenting) (citing arguments put forth by the Family Research 
Council, and noting the flawed research supporting those arguments), abrogated by Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  
141. See, e.g., Shankle v. Vill. of Melrose Park, No. 12 C 6923, 2013 WL 1828929, at *2 (N.D. 
Ill. Apr. 30, 2013).  
142. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1243 (N.J. 1999) (“The myth that a 
homosexual male is more likely than a heterosexual male to molest children has been 
demolished.”), rev’d on other grounds by Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
143. See Clifford J. Rosky, Like Father, Like Son: Homosexuality, Parenthood, and the Gender 
of Homophobia, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 257, 286–94 (2009) (detailing family court cases in 
which false stereotypes conflating homosexuality and molestation played a role in the outcome).  
144. J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).  
145. See Anthony Niedwiecki, Save Our Children: Overcoming the Narrative that Gays and 
Lesbians Are Harmful to Children, 21 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 125, 150 (2014) (“The narrative 
that gay people are dangerous to children also helped move the Florida legislature to pass a law 
banning adoptions by gays and lesbians . . . .”).  
146. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2010).   
147. Id. 
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LGBTQ individuals are simply no more likely than heterosexuals to 
sexually abuse children. Social science studies support this finding.148 
Federal and state governments have relied for decades on false 
stereotypes about the various sexual and social dangers that LGBTQ 
people present to keep queer adults away from children. Perhaps no part 
of the LGBTQ community has been hurt more by these false stereotypes 
than schoolteachers. William Eskridge explains that the “first antigay 
initiative to draw nationwide attention was Anita Bryant’s 1977 ‘Save 
Our Children’ campaign to repeal an antidiscrimination law adopted in 
Dade County, Florida.”149 Bryant focused specifically on the sexual and 
indoctrinating threats that openly gay teachers posed to children, and the 
initiative was ultimately successful.150 In 1978, the Briggs Initiative 
appeared on the California state ballot (eventually failing). It was, as 
Nan Hunter notes, “widely understood to be a vote on whether the state 
should fire gay teachers and thus purge that group from the schools and 
from contact with children.”151 These voter-initiated efforts were fueled 
by the familiar false stereotypes depicting gay people as “disgusting 
people and predatory child molesters.”152 
Even today, teachers risk losing their jobs if they come out as lesbian, 
gay, or bisexual. In a 2008 Wyoming case, for example, a lesbian 
schoolteacher was fired after her students’ parents complained about her 
same-sex relationship: she lost her discrimination case before the Tenth 
Circuit.153 Famously, Marjorie Rowland was fired from her job as a 
school guidance counselor in Ohio when she came out to a co-worker as 
bisexual.154 Dissenting from the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in 
                                                     
148. See, e.g., Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1243 (N.J. 1999) (citing studies 
“demolish[ing]” the “myth that a homosexual male is more likely than a heterosexual male to 
molest children”); R. L. GEISER, HIDDEN VICTIMS: THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN (1979) 
(finding that more heterosexual men than homosexual men molest children); Jerry J. Bigner & 
Frederick W. Bozett, Parenting by Gay Fathers, 14 MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 155, 171 (1989) (“[I]t 
is rare for a gay man to be a pedophile.”).  
149. William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse and 
the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1351 (2000).  
150. Id. at 1351–52.  
151. Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV. 1695, 1703 (1993).  
152. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the Constitution of Disgust 
and Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1014–19 (2005) (documenting the propaganda materials used 
to sway voters during the “Save Our Children” campaign and in the lead-up to the vote on the 
Briggs Initiative).  
153. Milligan-Hitt v. Bd. of Trs. of Sheridan Cty. Sch. Dist., 523 F.3d 1219, 1234 (10th Cir. 
2008). 
154. Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1009 (1985) (Brennan, J., joined 
by Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
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Rowland’s case, Justices Brennan and Marshall reviewed the lower court 
record and noted the “unchallenged” jury findings “that petitioner was 
suspended and not rehired solely because she was bisexual . . . and not 
for ‘any other reason.’”155 The record is not explicit about why Marjorie 
Rowland’s employer or her students’ parents objected to her bisexuality. 
It is logical to assume that many of the same false stereotypes 
undergirding antigay initiatives aimed at school teachers across America 
at that time motivated the firing decision.156 
False stereotyping violates both the anti-subordination and pro-liberty 
pillars of equal dignity. In Rowland v. Mad River Local School 
District,157 dissenting Justices Brennan and Marshall explained that this 
case raises important constitutional questions regarding individuals’ 
rights to “maintain and express their private sexual preferences.”158 This 
language sounds in the same register as Justice Kennedy’s emphasis in 
Obergefell on individuals’ rights “to define and express their identity” 
on an equal basis.159 These and other false stereotypes are often used to 
deny gay people the liberty to create and express their sexual identities 
in ways that are not denied to heterosexual individuals.160 It is highly 
unlikely that any school would fire a heterosexual woman simply for 
discussing her husband or disclosing that she had one. Moreover, false 
stereotypes also subordinate LGBTQ people. First, they subordinate in 
intangible ways by sending a clear message that homosexuality and 
bisexuality are inferior to heterosexuality. Second, they subordinate 
LGBTQ people in tangible ways by excluding them from opportunities 
in the market, relegating them to jobs that society deems appropriate for 
gay people. 
Simply put, false stereotyping is when the fit between the presumed 
group characteristic and the individual to whom that characteristic is 
ascribed is extremely poor or nonexistent. False stereotyping is the 
height of irrationality, and the government’s reliance on false stereotypes 
about any group to justify disparate treatment of individuals should be 
unconstitutional. 
                                                     
155. Id. at 1010.  
156. “This case demonstrates one of the most pernicious stereotypes wielded against the LGBT 
community: that these individuals are a detrimental influence over children.” Lisa Kye Young Kim, 
Comment, The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Act: The Interplay of the 
Judiciary and Congress in Suspect Classification Analysis, 12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 495, 514 (2011).  
157. 470 U.S. 1009 (1985). 
158. Id. at 1009 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
159. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015). 
160. See NeJaime, supra note 100, at 1199. 
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B. Normative Stereotyping 
Normative stereotyping is a second operative version in 
antidiscrimination law. As Professor Appiah explains, normative 
stereotyping involves taking some action due to beliefs about how an 
individual ought to behave based on his or her group membership.161 
Whereas false stereotyping often implicates passive reliance on 
inaccurate group generalizations, normative stereotyping involves the 
active construction and policing of what group identity should be.162 
LGBTQ individuals are all too aware of how normative stereotyping 
can materially disadvantage. Workplaces and schoolyards are riddled 
with bullies who harass sexual minorities and create a hostile 
environment because of a belief that men should be masculine and 
women should be feminine. In one well-known case, Prowel v. Wise 
Business Forms, Inc.,163 Brian Prowel, a gay man, was harassed at his 
workplace in rural Pennsylvania by his ostensibly straight coworkers. In 
Prowel’s words, the normative man at his workplace fit the following 
profile: “[b]lue jeans, t-shirt, blue collar worker, very rough around the 
edges. Most of the guys there hunted. Most of the guys there fished. If 
they drank, they drank beer, they didn’t drink gin and tonic. Just you 
know, all into football, sports, all that kind of stuff . . . .”164 By contrast, 
Prowel testified that, among his many other attributes, he “had a high 
voice and did not curse,” wore dressy clothes, “was neat,” “filed his 
nails instead of ripping them off with a utility knife,” crossed his legs in 
an effeminate manner, had a rainbow decal on his car, talked about “art, 
music, interior design, and décor,” and pushed machine buttons with 
“pizzazz.”165 
Over two years, Prowel’s co-workers relentlessly tormented him and 
“mock[ed] his effeminate mannerisms and appearance.”166 They called 
him “Princess,” “Rosebud,” “fag,” and “faggot.”167 They left notes at his 
                                                     
161. Appiah, supra note 30, at 48.  
162. The specific normative stereotypes at play may differ according to context. See, e.g., Back 
v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 119–21 (2d Cir. 2004) (explaining that 
what constitutes a gender-based stereotype depends on the “particular context” in which the 
question arises). For a robust discussion of how normative gender stereotypes can differ across race, 
class, and geographic lines, see generally Luke A. Boso, Real Men, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 107 (2015).  
163. 579 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2009).  
164. Id. at 287.  
165. Id.  
166. Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-259, 2007 WL 2702664, at *1 (W.D. Pa. 
Sept. 13, 2007), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded by Prowel, 579 F.3d 285. 
167. Prowel, 579 F.3d at 287. 
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workstation, mockingly requesting sexual favors.168 They wrote antigay 
graffiti on the bathroom walls, specifically claiming that Prowel had 
AIDS.169 They commented to each other, “[d]id you see what Rosebud 
was wearing,” “[d]id you see Rosebud sitting there with his legs crossed, 
filing his nails,” and “[l]ook at the way he walks.”170 They even vocally 
expressed a desire that someone “should shoot all the fags.”171 Prowel 
sued, claiming that this harassment amounted to unlawful sex 
discrimination under Title VII.172 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
permitted Prowel’s case to go forward, reasoning that the facts 
“constitute sufficient evidence of gender stereotyping harassment—
namely, Prowel was harassed because he did not conform to Wise’s 
vision of how a man should look, speak, and act.”173 
The federal reporters are filled with cases containing similarly 
shocking facts.174 But not all instances of normative stereotyping 
showcase such stark mistreatment. In fact, normative stereotyping is a 
ubiquitous mechanism for sorting and differentiating between men and 
women in workplaces, places of public accommodation, schools, and 
social life. When and whether normative stereotyping amounts to a 
constitutional or statutory wrong is thus a contextual and controversial 
question. As Robert Post argues, normative stereotypes about differences 
between men and women are the very “conventions that underwrite the 
social practice of gender,”175 and antidiscrimination law does not and 
should not obliterate gender altogether.176 Judith Butler, famous for her 
theories on the social construction of gender, concedes, “it is not clear 
that the elimination of gender is an undisputed political goal of 
feminism.”177 
Courts have so far resisted calls to forbid all normative stereotyping, 
perhaps sensing that it is impossible and maybe even undesirable to 
render gender obsolete. Nowhere is this resistance more apparent than in 
                                                     
168. Id.  
169. Id. at 287–88.  
170. Id. at 287.  
171. Id.  
172. Id. at 286.  
173. Id. at 292.  
174. For examples of cases in which gay men are harassed because they fail to satisfy masculine 
norms, see generally Luke A. Boso, Acting Gay, Acting Straight: Sexual Orientation Stereotyping, 
83 TENN. L. REV. 575 (2016).   
175. Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 18 (2000).  
176. Id. at 20.  
177. Judith Butler, “Appearances Aside,” 88 CALIF. L. REV. 55, 60 (2000).  
04 - Boso.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2017  9:44 AM 
1148 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1119 
 
cases challenging gendered grooming and dress codes.178 A famous 
example is Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co.,179 in which plaintiff 
Darlene Jespersen was fired from her job as a bartender when she 
refused to wear makeup.180 Jespersen had worked in Harrah’s casino for 
twenty years before it instituted and enforced a new dress and grooming 
code policy.181 The policy, known as the “Personal Best” program, 
included some requirements that applied to men and women alike, 
including a “standard uniform of black pants, white shirt, black vest, and 
black bow tie.”182 In addition, the Personal Best program relied on 
normative gender stereotypes in the following key ways: for women, (1) 
“[h]air must be teased, curled, or styled” and always worn down; and (2) 
“[m]ake up (face powder, blush and mascara) must be worn and applied 
neatly in complimentary colors. Lip color must be worn at all times.”183 
The Personal Best program expressly forbade men from wearing 
makeup.184 
Darlene Jespersen sued Harrah’s, arguing that the Personal Best 
program unlawfully treated men and women differently on the basis of 
sex.185 Specifically, Jespersen claimed that the program required that 
“women conform to sex-based stereotypes as a term and condition of 
employment.”186 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc 
rejected Jespersen’s claims, invoking a theory of sex discrimination that 
permits policy differentiations between men and women provided that 
the policy does not impose “unequal burdens.”187 In a somewhat baffling 
analysis, the Court also rejected the contention that the Personal Best 
program had either the purpose or effect of requiring men and women to 
adhere to normative gender stereotypes.188 
                                                     
178. See, e.g., RUTHANN ROBSON, DRESSING CONSTITUTIONALLY: HIERARCHY, SEXUALITY, 
AND DEMOCRACY FROM OUR HAIRSTYLES TO OUR SHOES 60–68 (2013) (discussing courts’ 
unwillingness to rule that grooming and dress distinctions between men and women constitute sex 
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause).  
179. 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).  
180. Id. at 1105–06.  
181. Id. at 1105–07.  
182. Id. at 1107.  
183. Id.  
184. Id.  
185. Id. at 1108.  
186. Id.  
187. Id. at 1110.  
188. Id. at 1111–12. The court offered a tautology rather than a critical analysis of what sex 
stereotyping means. See id. 
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In both Brian Prowel’s and Darlene Jespersen’s cases, decision-
makers expected an individual to adhere to normative sex stereotypes. 
Prowel’s coworkers presumably wanted him to be manlier—perhaps by 
fishing, hunting, looking rougher rather than tidy, and, most importantly, 
being straight. Jespersen’s employer wanted her to be more feminine by 
conforming to norms of female beauty, which apparently deem women’s 
natural faces unacceptable.189 
What accounts for these different outcomes? Why did normative 
stereotyping suggest sex discrimination for Prowel and not for 
Jespersen? As Professor Ben-Asher argues, courts historically treated 
subordination, particularly regarding group-based exclusion from 
opportunities in the marketplace, as the overriding wrong of 
stereotyping.190 Under this theory, normative stereotyping is unlawful 
when it subordinates men or women by pigeon-holing individuals into 
specific sex roles at work or home, thereby limiting market 
opportunities.191 In Prowel, the ways in which Brian Prowel’s coworkers 
deployed normative stereotypes ignored his individual skills and 
tangibly obstructed his ability to earn a living. Because of his sex, he 
was excluded from opportunity. The Third Circuit noted that his “work 
environment became so stressful that he had to stop his car on the way to 
work to vomit.”192 In Jespersen, by contrast, the Ninth Circuit found no 
evidence “to suggest the grooming standards would objectively inhibit a 
woman’s ability to do the job.”193 The court went on to state that the 
“only evidence in the record to support the stereotyping claim is 
Jespersen’s own subjective reaction to the makeup requirement.”194 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Jespersen supports Professor Ben-
Asher’s observations: whether normative stereotyping is unlawful, or 
even recognized as stereotyping, often turns on whether it subordinates 
by denying equal opportunity due to group status. The Jespersen court 
ignores how normative stereotyping also denies individual liberty; the 
court is indifferent to a person’s “subjective reaction” and resistance to 
requirements that he or she conform to conventional notions of 
masculinity and femininity. This is particularly problematic for LGBTQ 
                                                     
189. See Jennifer C. Pizer, Facial Discrimination: Darlene Jespersen’s Fight Against the 
Barbie-fication of Bartenders, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 285, 287 (2007). Pizer represented 
Jespersen in her appeal before the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 285.  
190. See generally Ben-Asher, supra note 112.  
191. Id.  
192. Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 288 (3d Cir. 2009). 
193. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112. 
194. Id. (emphasis added).  
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individuals who by virtue of their sexual orientation may be unable to 
conform to normative gender stereotypes,195 and for whom the burden of 
assimilation demands may keenly deny core components of self.196 
Discrimination against transgender individuals vividly demonstrates 
how normative stereotyping can both subordinate and deny individual 
liberty choices in identity formation and expression. In early litigation, 
most courts failed even to recognize how normative stereotyping 
permeates the disparate treatment of transgender individuals.197 In Etsitty 
v. Utah Transit Authority,198 for example, Krystal Etsitty’s employer 
terminated her employment after she “began wearing makeup, jewelry, 
and acrylic nails,” and after she began using women’s restrooms while at 
work.199 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals first rejected the claim that 
discrimination on the basis of an individual’s identity as transgender is 
per se sex discrimination.200 Next, the court rejected the claim, due to 
insufficient evidence, that Etsitty was “a biological male who was 
discriminated against for failing to conform to social stereotypes about 
how a man should act and appear.”201 The court did not understand that 
requiring a transwoman to wear men’s clothing and use restrooms 
consistent with the male sex that she was assigned at birth is a demand 
for gender conformity—a demand that a transwoman “act like a man.” 
Recently, and in a welcome development, some courts are beginning 
to understand how transgender discrimination involves normative 
stereotyping. In Barnes v. City of Cincinnati,202 the Sixth Circuit 
permitted a transgender individual’s sex discrimination claim to go 
forward because she alleged that her demotion in the police department 
                                                     
195. See, e.g., Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 410 (D. Mass. 2002) (noting that antigay 
harassment is often categorically sex discrimination because the gender stereotype at work is: 
“‘real’ men should date women” and vice versa).  
196. See, e.g., Pizer, supra note 189, at 286–87 (noting that LGBTQ individuals are 
disproportionately burdened by gendered dress and appearance codes).  
197. The earliest cases to reject sex discrimination claims by transgender individuals made the 
facile distinction between sex classifications and transgender classifications, concluding that the 
former are impermissible while the latter are not. See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 
1086 (7th Cir. 1984) (“to include transsexuals within the reach of Title VII far exceeds mere 
statutory interpretation” because “Congress had a narrow view of sex in mind”); Holloway v. Arthur 
Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[t]his court cannot conclude that transsexuals 
are a suspect class” under the Equal Protection Clause). 
198. 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).  
199. Id. at 1219.  
200. Id. at 1222. Simply put, the argument is that transgender discrimination necessarily 
involves the considerations about a person’s biological sex. See id. 
201. Id. at 1223–24.  
202. 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005). 
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was due to her “failure to conform to sex stereotypes concerning how a 
man should look and behave.”203 Likewise, in Glenn v. Brumby,204 the 
Eleventh Circuit answered in the affirmative the question of whether 
discrimination against transgender individuals constitutes sex 
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause: “[a] person is defined 
as transgender precisely because of the perception that his or her 
behavior transgresses gender stereotypes,” and there “is thus a 
congruence between discriminating against transgender and transsexual 
individuals and discrimination on the basis of gender-based behavioral 
norms.”205 
Governmental discrimination against transgender individuals also 
sends the subordinating message that trans people as a group are inferior 
to cisgender people as a group. That message rang loud and clear when 
the North Carolina legislature—in a rushed special session that was the 
first of its kind in thirty-five years206—passed a sweeping antigay and 
anti-trans bill (HB2) in the spring of 2016. HB2 eliminated all local 
antidiscrimination protections for LGBTQ people and required 
transgender individuals to use public restrooms that match their 
biological sex.207 The ACLU promptly sued North Carolina, arguing that 
North Carolina enacted HB2 out of LGBTQ animus, and because of its 
adverse effects on LGBTQ people.208 The Obama administration also 
filed suit, arguing that HB2, and specifically its provisions requiring that 
transgender individuals use the restroom corresponding to their 
biological sex, is a violation of the anti-stereotyping principle underlying 
several federal antidiscrimination laws.209 In public statements 
explaining the administration’s lawsuit, Attorney General Loretta Lynch 
spoke directly and empathetically to the transgender community: “[w]hat 
                                                     
203. Id. at 737 (finding that Barnes stated a claim for relief under Title VII).  
204. 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011).  
205. Id. at 1316.  
206. See Luke A. Boso, Animus and Unequal Dignity: The Purpose and Effect of North 
Carolina’s New Anti-LGBT Law, OXFORD HUM. RTS. HUB (Apr. 14, 2016), 
http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/animus-and-unequal-dignity-the-purpose-and-effect-of-north-carolinas-
new-anti-lgbt-law/ [https://perma.cc/4ZAE-XLX7]. 
207. See Motoko Rich, North Carolina Gay Bias Law Draws a Sharp Backlash, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/25/us/north-carolina-law-antidiscrimination-pat-
mccrory.html [https://perma.cc/M53Y-WY8R]. 
208. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 36, Carcano v. North Carolina, No. 
1:16-cv-236 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 28, 2016).  
209. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff United States’s Motion for Preliminary 
Injunctive Relief at 1–2, United States v. McCrory, No. 1:16-cv-425 (M.D.N.C. July 5, 2016), 
http://ftpcontent4.worldnow.com/wbtv/pdf/2368454-0—22077.pdf [https://perma.cc/HMZ3-HF5R]. 
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this law does is inflict further indignity for a population that has already 
suffered far more than its fair share.”210 
More than countering subordination, though, the primary effect of 
recent transgender discrimination cases that acknowledge the role of 
normative stereotyping is to liberate all individuals from certain norms 
dictating the proper ways to be a (biological) man or a woman. A 
biological man may now identify as a woman, wear acrylic nails, and 
use the women’s restroom if she so chooses, as long as biological 
women are equally permitted to do so.211 Even these relatively 
progressive cases, however, offer a cramped vision of equal liberty. 
Many transgender individuals reject sex and gender binaries,212 forming 
and expressing identities that rely not on a framework of fixed categories 
but on a spectrum of fluid sex- and gender-expressions.213 Further, as 
Jespersen demonstrates, courts have ruled that individuals may only 
express their gender identities in accordance with dress and grooming 
codes that rely on a binary sex model.214 In other words, courts are 
beginning to prohibit the government and private entities from insisting 
that individuals identify and express gender congruently with their 
biological sex, but those individuals may only express their gender in 
ways deemed normatively appropriate for men and women (depending 
on how the individual identifies).215 Much legal work remains before 
equality law guarantees a robust vision of equal dignity that protects 
                                                     
210. David A. Graham, ‘State-Sponsored Discrimination’: Loretta Lynch Takes on North 
Carolina’s Bathroom Bill, ATLANTIC (May 9, 2016) (emphasis added), http://www. 
theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/state-sponsored-discrimination-loretta-lynch-takes-on-
north-carolinas-hb2/481986/ [https://perma.cc/PD3K-R44Y].  
211. As this point subtly illustrates, one key problem with these anti-stereotyping cases is that a 
transwoman must frame herself as a biological male who was punished for acting like a woman; in 
other words, she must uncomfortably position her female self-identity against her male assignation 
to fit the gender stereotyping theory. 
212. See, e.g., Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S 
L.J. 15, 23–24 (2003) (discussing how the medical model of transgender identity and status 
legitimizes a binary gender system). Many trans people reject notions of “real” men and women, 
and instead regard their transformations as “freeing them to express more of themselves, and 
enabling more comfortable and exciting self understandings and images.” Id. at 28.  
213. See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley, Erasing Boundaries: Masculinities, Sexual Minorities, and 
Employment Discrimination, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 713, 746 (2010) (explaining that 
transgender individuals include those who wear “opposite-sex” clothing for emotional purposes, 
those who wear “opposite-sex” clothing for sexual purposes, and “androgynous, bigendered, and 
gendered queer people”).  
214. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
215. See Ben-Asher, supra note 112, at 1214 (noting that transgender discrimination cases 
involving the anti-stereotyping theory “have not involved reassessing norms of mandatory 
appearance”).  
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individuals’ liberty to form and express gender identities on their own 
terms. 
In truth, normative stereotypes often reflect majoritarian beliefs about 
group membership that many individual group members may not find 
offensive. Lots of women, for example, do not object to grooming 
policies that mandate makeup.216 Nevertheless, normative stereotyping 
can be harmful when, like false stereotyping, it both (1) subordinates 
individuals by keeping them locked in fixed patterns of group oriented 
conduct that may have broad social implications about that group’s 
standing and value; and (2) denies individual autonomy to express 
identity not tethered to someone else’s beliefs about what group 
membership means or should mean. This is precisely the kind of 
stereotyping that kept Ann Hopkins—who famously lost a job 
promotion because she needed to “walk more femininely, talk more 
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, 
and wear jewelry”217—from expressing her identity as a woman on her 
own terms, which in turn perpetuated the group subordination of women 
in the workplace. 
C. Statistical Stereotyping 
For antidiscrimination law, statistical stereotyping is perhaps the most 
vexing. When can the government account for statistically relevant 
information about a group when it enacts a policy that responds to that 
group’s needs, capabilities, or interests? Does governmental reliance on 
that information constitute stereotyping? Does reliance on certain 
statistical truths reinforce stereotypes, keeping in motion self-
perpetuating and self-justifying cycles of discrimination?218 
Consider a public health example regarding a drug called Truvada, 
which doctors now regularly prescribe to certain high-risk individuals as 
                                                     
216. “[S]ome women are sufficiently accustomed to wearing makeup” and “consider it 
inoffensive and nonremarkable.” Pizer, supra note 189, at 311. 
217. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012). 
218. See Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 995, 1106 
(2015) (arguing that discriminatory practices premised on statistical stereotypes about male and 
female differences lead to normative (i.e., “prescriptive”) stereotypes about how men and women 
should behave, cyclically perpetuating the discriminatory practices). Schultz discusses employers’ 
“lack of interest” defense to sex discrimination claims, under which employers explain disparities in 
men’s and women’s hiring and promotion practices by arguing that men and women have different 
interests regarding certain jobs or promotion opportunities. Id. at 1048–66. Courts’ acceptance of 
this defense ignores that these practices “may have been the consequence, and not the cause,” of the 
disparities. Id. at 1052.  
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one way to prevent HIV transmission.219 The federal government 
explicitly recommends Truvada as Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP) for 
any non-monogamous “gay or bisexual man who has had anal sex 
without using a condom.”220 As Russell Robinson and David Frost 
explain, the federal government “has chosen to direct Truvada as PrEP at 
HIV-negative gay and bisexual men broadly, as if their identities alone 
constitute risk of infection.”221 To the extent that some statistical truth 
underlies the generalization that gay and bisexual-identified men as a 
group are at greater risk for HIV transmission than straight-identified 
men as a group,222 does the government’s PrEP recommendation deny 
equal dignity by ascribing non-monogamy, HIV status, or PrEP usage 
stereotypes to gay and bisexual group membership in contradiction with 
individual gay and bisexual men’s lived experiences? 
As Professor Appiah explains, statistical stereotyping involves (1) a 
statistically true correlation between some characteristic and group 
membership, and (2) ascribing or applying that characteristic to an 
individual group member.223 Thus, the government engages in statistical 
stereotyping whenever policy hinges on statistical data tied to group 
membership rather than an evaluation of individuals’ characteristics.224 
Statistical stereotyping is necessarily pervasive. It would be 
impossible and even foolhardy to enact public policy in a country as 
large and diverse as the United States without reliance on statistical 
                                                     
219. HIV Basics: PrEP, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc. 
gov/hiv/basics/prep.html [https://perma.cc/MRQ2-V8TC]. 
220. Id.  
221. Russell K. Robinson & David M. Frost, The Afterlife of Homophobia, ARIZ. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 38) (on file with author). 
222. Fujie Xu et al., Men Who Have Sex with Men in the United States: Demographic and 
Behavioral Characteristics and Prevalence of HIV and HSV-2 Infection, Results from National 
Health and Nutrition Examination Study 2001–2006, 37 SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES 399, 
399 (2010) (finding that, “[i]n the United States, male-to-male sexual contact remains the most 
important route of HIV transmission”). Importantly, there is a significant categorical difference 
between men who have sex with men (or have had sex with another man at least once) and men who 
identity as gay or bisexual. See, e.g., Luke A. Boso, Urban Bias, Sexual Minorities, and the Courts, 
60 UCLA L. REV. 562, 594–99 (2013) (explaining that many people in rural America who have 
same-sex sex are uncomfortable identifying as lesbian, gay, or bisexual); Russell K. Robinson, 
Racing the Closet, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1463 (2009) (explaining why many Black men who have sex 
with men do not identify as bisexual or gay).  
223. Appiah, supra note 30, at 47.  
224. In City of L.A., Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707–08 (1978), for 
example, the Supreme Court accepted the “generalization” that women live longer than men as 
“unquestionably true,” but nevertheless characterized this statistical generalization as “stereotyped” 
because “all individuals in the respective classes do not share the characteristic that differentiates 
the average class representatives.”  
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evidence that considers group identity. The potential problem with 
statistical stereotyping is that individuals are often atypical of their 
groups.225 When the government acts on the basis of statistical 
information about groups, and that information does not reflect reality 
for a particular individual, that individual may be impacted unfairly. 
1. The Supreme Court’s Sex-Based Statistical Stereotyping 
Jurisprudence 
In several important cases, the Supreme Court has responded with 
opprobrium when the government relies on statistical stereotypes to 
justify discriminatory policies that treat men and women as groups 
differently. Consider the following three examples. 
First, in United States v. Virginia,226 the United States sued the state 
of Virginia after a female high school student sought and was denied 
admission to the Virginia Military Institute (VMI).227 In the two years 
prior to the lawsuit’s initiation, 347 women inquired about enrollment at 
VMI, yet VMI’s formal policy precluded female admissions.228 VMI 
defended its male-only admissions policy in part by asserting that it had 
an important (“exceedingly persuasive”) interest in preserving the 
rigorous and physically demanding adversative educational program that 
it used to teach cadets.229 VMI argued that admitting women would 
require “radical,” “drastic,” and ultimately destructive modifications.230 
Namely, VMI would have to modify “housing assignments and physical 
training programs for female cadets,” as well as the adversative method 
itself.231 VMI made these arguments in partial reliance on the findings of 
a Task Force compromised of experts in educating women at the college 
level.232 The Task Force found that “a military model and, especially 
VMI’s adversative method, would be wholly inappropriate for educating 
and training most women,”233 and “while ‘some women would be suited 
                                                     
225. See id.  
226. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).  
227. Id. at 523.  
228. Id.  
229. Id. at 534–35.  
230. Id. at 540.  
231. Id.  
232. Id. at 526–27.  
233. Id. at 549 (emphasis in original).  
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to and interested in [a VMI-style experience],’ VMI’s adversative 
method ‘would not be effective for women as a group.’”234 
In an opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, the Court rejected VMI’s 
arguments. The Court did not dismiss evidence of statistical differences 
between men and women, and in fact “assumed, for purposes of this 
decision, that most women would not choose VMI’s adversative 
method.”235 Nevertheless, the Court did not permit the government to 
rely on these statistical stereotypes because it should instead focus on the 
individual women “who have the will and capacity” to endure the 
adversative program.236 Accordingly, even if VMI could prove a strong 
statistical correlation between women as a group and certain 
characteristics that do not mesh well with VMI’s educational program—
such as relatively less physical strength compared to men, and a 
preference for a softer educational style—these statistical facts do not 
matter under the Equal Protection Clause. VMI simply cannot engage in 
“categorical exclusion” of women “in total disregard of their individual 
merit.”237 
In Craig v. Boren,238 as a second example, the Court struck down an 
Oklahoma statute that differentiated when individuals can buy non-
intoxicating beer based solely on sex: women could purchase when they 
turned eighteen years old, but men had to wait until they were twenty-
one.239 Oklahoma defended this sex classification by introducing 
statistical evidence of male and female differences regarding 
drunkenness, driving under the influence, and automobile fatalities.240 
The Court responded: “[e]ven were this statistical evidence accepted as 
accurate, it nevertheless offers only a weak answer to the equal 
protection question presented here.”241 The statistical differences 
themselves, the Court worried, likely reflect social stereotypes wherein 
“‘reckless’ young men who drink and drive are transformed into arrest 
statistics, whereas their female counterparts are chivalrously escorted 
home.”242 
                                                     
234. Id. (emphasis in original).  
235. Id. at 542.  
236. Id. 
237. Id. at 546.  
238. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
239. Id. at 191–92. 
240. Id. at 200–01.  
241. Id. at 201.  
242. Id. at 202 n.14.  
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Here, validating statistical stereotypes would necessarily perpetuate 
the normative social stereotypes that lead to statistical male and female 
differences regarding alcohol use and unsafe behavior. Percolating in the 
Court’s analysis is precisely this concern: alcohol laws that facially 
burden men more than women have the actual effect of subordinating 
women by keeping young women dependent on men as their presumably 
sober chauffeurs and guardians. In turn, young men who drive while 
taking young women out on dates, and who are legally required to 
remain sober while their date may drink non-intoxicating alcohol, may 
nevertheless drink on the date and engage in drunk driving. 
Third and finally, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., Alabama filed a 
complaint on behalf of a mother seeking a paternity determination and 
child support payments against the presumed father of her minor 
child.243 During jury selection, the State used nine of its ten peremptory 
strikes to remove male jurors, and the jury ultimately consisted entirely 
of women.244 On appeal after trial, at which the all-woman jury found 
J.E.B. to be the biological father and liable for child support payments, 
the Supreme Court began its analysis of the sex-based peremptory 
strikes by detailing the history of women’s exclusion from jury 
service.245 It then explained why all sex classifications receive 
heightened judicial scrutiny: because of the “real danger” that sex 
classifications may reflect “outdated misconceptions concerning the role 
of females in the home rather than in the ‘marketplace and world of 
ideas.’”246 
The State went on to defend its sex-based peremptory strikes by 
relying on statistical stereotypes about male and female differences in 
their relative biases and sympathies. 
[M]en otherwise totally qualified to serve upon a jury in any 
case might be more sympathetic and receptive to the arguments 
of a man alleged in a paternity action to be the father of an out-
of-wedlock child, while women equally qualified to serve upon 
a jury might be more sympathetic and receptive to the arguments 
of the complaining witness who bore the child.247 
The State cited one empirical study purporting to show some 
difference in how men and women judge in gendered cases.248 The Court 
                                                     
243. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994).  
244. Id.  
245. Id. at 131–34.  
246. Id. at 135 (citing Craig, 429 U.S. at 198–99).  
247. Id. at 137–38 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 10, J.E.B., 511 U.S. 127 (No. 92-1239)). 
248. Id. at 138 n.9.  
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did not outright reject the premise that statistical differences may exist 
between men’s and women’s sympathies in court cases wherein gender 
is relevant, suggesting that “a measure of truth can be found in some of 
the gender stereotypes used to justify gender-based peremptory 
challenges.”249 Nevertheless, the Court rejected the State’s rationale, 
explaining that this kind of stereotyped thinking is reminiscent of the 
very justifications that subordinated women as a group and kept them off 
of juries for most of the Nation’s history.250 
2. Contemporary Examples of LGBTQ Statistical Stereotyping 
Consider the FDA’s stance on whether gay and bisexual men are 
eligible to donate blood and sperm. In the wake of a June 2016 shooting 
at an Orlando, Florida gay bar that left forty-nine people dead and fifty-
three others hospitalized, the LGBTQ community came forward in 
droves to grieve, connect with loved ones, and donate blood.251 Many 
gay and bisexual men were shocked to find out that they were ineligible 
to donate.252 After the deadliest mass shooting in modern history in 
which one person targeted the LGBTQ community with extreme 
violence, gay and bisexual men who wanted to donate blood to help their 
injured friends and family were turned away—shut out from assisting 
their own community when it needed them, and when they needed it 
most. 
Before December 2015, the FDA flatly prohibited any man who had 
had sex with another man since 1977 from donating blood.253 The FDA 
has since tweaked its policy, and it now recommends barring from 
donation men who have sex with men only if they have been sexually 
active within the last year.254 Similarly, the FDA requires any entity that 
                                                     
249. Id. at 139 n.11.  
250. Id. at 138.  
251. See, e.g., Blake Lynch, I Am a Gay Man from Orlando. Why Can’t I Donate Blood?, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/14/opinion/i-am-a-gay-man-from-
orlando-why-cant-i-donate-blood.html [https://perma.cc/K7MR-X4JY]. 
252. See, e.g., Donald G. McNeil Jr., Orlando Shooting Renews Debate Over Limits on Gay Men 
Donating Blood, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/16/health/orlando-
shooting-renews-debate-over-limits-on-gay-men-donating-blood.html [https://perma.cc/K7P9-
QU33].  
253. Emily K. White, Essay, A Reason for Hope? A Legal and Ethical Implementation of the 
HIV Organ Policy Equity Act, 96 B.U. L. REV. 609, 621 (2016).  
254. CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RESEARCH, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
REVISED RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REDUCING THE RISK OF HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS 
TRANSMISSION BY BLOOD AND BLOOD PRODUCTS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 14 (2015), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformati
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accepts human sperm donations to screen as ineligible potentially risky 
donors,255 and the FDA’s guidance document lists “[m]en who have had 
sex with another man in the preceding 5 years” as the top risk.256 In 
effect, federal law prohibits most gay and bisexual men from donating 
blood and sperm. The federal government cites statistics to justify these 
policies,257 pointing to data showing that men who have sex with men 
comprise the group most likely to contract HIV in the United States.258 
While statistical data may show that gay and bisexual men as a group 
are more likely to contract HIV than other groups,259 obviously not all 
individual gay and bisexual men have HIV or engage in the kinds of 
risky conduct that can lead to infection. These individual men suffer a 
dignitary harm at the hands of the government. The government is 
telling them that they are less worthy and even subordinate to straight 
men in the exercise of a vital public service. This subordination is 
particularly pronounced given that the FDA does not presume that 
straight men are likely to have HIV simply because of their sexuality, 
regardless of how many sexual partners a straight man has had or 
whether he has engaged in unprotected oral, anal, or vaginal sex.260 
Moreover, the government’s reliance on statistical stereotypes 
subordinates gay and bisexual men because an individual assessment of 
infection is readily available. In fact, the FDA’s own rules and 
guidelines provide for rigorous testing of all blood donations, and these 
tests are almost 100% effective in screening for HIV antibodies and the 
virus itself.261 The FDA’s protocol for testing sperm donations is even 
                                                     
on/Guidances/Blood/UCM446580.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2017) (“Defer for 12 months from the 
most recent sexual contact, a man who has had sex with another man during the past 12 months.”).  
255. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.75(a), (d) (2015). 
256. CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATION FOR DONORS OF HUMAN CELLS, 
TISSUES, AND CELLULAR AND TISSUE-BASED PRODUCTS (HCT/PS) 14 (2007), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformati
on/Guidances/Tissue/UCM091345.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2017). 
257. Mathew L. Morrison, Note, Bad Blood: An Examination of the Constitutional Deficiencies 
of the FDA’s “Gay Blood Ban,” 99 MINN. L. REV. 2363, 2364 (2015).  
258. Id. at 2372; see also HIV Among Gay and Bisexual Men, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/group/msm/index.html [https://perma.cc/D2Q6-VNK6] (last 
updated Apr. 25, 2017) (“Gay, bisexual, and other men who have sex with men made up an 
estimated 2% of the population but 55% of people living with HIV in the United States in 2013.”). 
259. Xu et al., supra note 222, at 399 (finding that the prevalence of HIV was 0.2% in men who 
reported having sex with only women, 9.1% in men who had sex with another man at least once in 
his life, and 11.8% in men who had sex with another man within the past year). 
260. See Luke A. Boso, Note, The Unjust Exclusion of Gay Sperm Donors: Litigation Strategies 
to End Discrimination in the Gene Pool, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 843, 844 (2008).  
261. Dwayne J. Bensing, Comment, Science or Stigma: Potential Challenges to the FDA’s Ban 
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more rigorous and prolonged.262 Nevertheless, no court has ever held 
either of these antigay policies to be unconstitutional under the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
There are signs of positive change in some federal courts. In a case 
comparable to the Supreme Court’s J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. 
decision, the Ninth Circuit in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott 
Laboratories implicitly recognized that statistical stereotypes about gays 
as a group, when used to justify peremptory jury strikes, can both 
subordinate and deny equal liberty.263 The litigation at issue in 
SmithKline involved two pharmaceutical companies and their disputes 
over certain HIV medications.264 During jury selection, “Abbott used its 
first peremptory strike against the only self-identified gay member of the 
venire.”265 In addition to indicating that he has a male partner, the 
potential juror also revealed that he takes a medication produced by 
defendants, and that he has HIV-positive friends (who theoretically 
could have an interest in defendants’ HIV-related medications).266 
Despite these facts, the Ninth Circuit found a “prima facie case of 
intentional discrimination” because the potential juror was “the only 
juror to have identified himself as gay on the record, and the subject 
matter of the litigation,” HIV medications, “presented an issue of 
consequence to the gay community.”267 Given the devastating toll that 
HIV and AIDS have had on gay and bisexual men, it is not unreasonable 
to presume that gay men may statistically care more about HIV 
medications than the general population. 
Nevertheless, the court rejected an interest in HIV/AIDS related 
issues as a characteristic statistically correlated to the LGBTQ 
community as a reason for striking a gay juror. The court began its 
analysis by hitting chords of anti-subordination, stating emphatically that 
“[g]ays and lesbians have been systematically excluded from the most 
important institutions of self-governance.”268 To exclude gay men from 
juries in trials involving gay related issues would perpetuate this 
systematic exclusion of gay people from civic life.269 Sexual orientation-
                                                     
on Gay Blood, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 485, 492–94 (2011).  
262. Boso, supra note 260, at 847–48.  
263. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 486 (9th Cir. 2014). 
264. Id. at 474.  
265. Id.  
266. Id. at 471.  
267. Id. at 476.  
268. Id. at 484.  
269. “Strikes exercised on the basis of sexual orientation continue this deplorable tradition of 
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based strikes “tell the individual who has been struck . . . that our 
judicial system treats gays and lesbians differently.”270 Moreover, 
exclusion “demean[s] the dignity of the individual.”271 While the court 
does not ground its analysis in gays’ rights to create and express identity, 
its analysis invokes ideas about freedom: wholesale exclusion denies 
“individuals of the opportunity to participate in perfecting democracy 
and guarding our ideals of justice”272—a liberty not denied to straight 
people simply because of their sexual orientation. 
Using the LGBTQ community’s heightened interest in LGBTQ issues 
as a foundation for exclusion is reminiscent of the public controversy 
over Judge Vaughn Walker, who famously presided over the Proposition 
8 trial. In Perry v. Schwarzenegger,273 plaintiffs in same-sex 
relationships challenged California’s voter-enacted constitutional 
amendment that redefined marriage as only between a man and a 
woman.274 After the trial, in which Judge Walker found Proposition 8 to 
be unconstitutional, Judge Walker retired, came out as gay, and revealed 
that he was in a long-term same-sex relationship.275 Proponents of 
Proposition 8 then filed a motion seeking to vacate the judgment, 
implicitly arguing that Judge Walker’s status as gay and in a same-sex 
relationship affected his judgment in the case.276 Although the 
proponents did not argue that gay judges are per se biased in cases 
affecting LGBTQ rights,277 an argument to that effect could likely be 
supported by statistical evidence showing the relatively unsurprising 
finding that gay-identified individuals largely favor gay rights.278 
A federal judge nevertheless ruled against the proponents, reasoning 
that the fact that a judge shares characteristics with those members of the 
                                                     
treating gays and lesbians as undeserving of participation in our nation’s most cherished rites and 
rituals.” Id. at 485.  
270. Id.  
271. Id.  
272. Id.  
273. 790 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2011).  
274. Id. at 1121. 
275. Id.  
276. Id. at 1124.  
277. The proponents of Proposition 8 were careful to assert that their motion was not based on 
“bias against gay or lesbian judges or based on the broad proposition that a gay or lesbian judge is 
incapable of being fair if sexual orientation is an issue in a case.” Id. 
278. See Patrick J. Egan, Group Cohesion Without Group Mobilization: The Case of Lesbians, 
Gays, and Bisexuals, 42 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 597, 599 (2012) (showing empirically that lesbians, gays, 
and bisexuals are more liberal than the general population and “hold distinctive views on the legal 
recognition of same-sex relationships”).  
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public who will be affected by the outcome of a case is not a basis for 
judicial disqualification. In fact, the attempt to discredit Judge Walker is 
just one instance in a history of litigants’ unsuccessful attempts to 
remove minority judges from cases involving civil rights.279 Crediting 
statistical stereotypes about group biases and political sentiments as a 
justification for excluding women, people of color, and LGBTQ 
individuals from the justice system would further subordinate groups 
that exist outside of the majority and have relatively little political 
power. 
D. Recap: How False, Normative, and Statistical Stereotyping Can 
Deny Equal Dignity 
In the summer of 2016, Donald Trump, then the Republican nominee 
for President, came under intense political fire when he criticized the 
federal judge overseeing a fraud case against Trump University.280 
Donald Trump argued that Judge Gonzalo Curiel could not be impartial 
in the class action suit against Trump because Judge Curiel is of 
“Mexican” heritage and was a member of the La Raza Lawyers 
Association.281 Meanwhile, Trump had previously stated publicly that 
Mexican immigrants are “criminals, drug dealers, rapists, etc.,”282 and a 
core component of his political platform was that the U.S. would “build 
a wall” along the U.S.-Mexico border to curtail illegal immigration.283 
Perhaps Trump’s assumptions about Judge Curiel’s potential biases due 
                                                     
279. See, e.g., United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1987). Here, the United States 
sued to end segregation of Alabama’s institutions of higher learning, and various individuals 
intervened as plaintiffs. Id. at 1534–35. Appellants argued that Judge Clemon—a Black man with 
two minor children who were members of the plaintiff class—was disqualified from hearing the 
case in part because his impartiality could reasonably be questioned. Id. at 1541–42. The Eleventh 
Circuit explained that Judge Clemon’s background cannot disqualify him because “[a]ll judges 
come to the bench with a background of experiences, associations, and viewpoints.” Id. at 1543.  
280. Jose A. DelReal & Katie Zezima, Trump’s Personal, Racially Tinged Attacks on Federal 
Judge Alarm Legal Experts, WASH. POST (June 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
2016/06/01/437ccae6-280b-11e6-a3c4-0724e8e24f3f_story.html [https://perma.cc/GXZ9-YRLU]. 
281. Hanna Trudo, Trump Escalates Attack on ‘Mexican’ Judge, POLITICO (June 2, 2016, 
 11:27 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/donald-trump-judge-gonzalo-curiel-223849 
[https://perma.cc/G35S-WVJ3]. 
282. Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Donald Trump’s False Comments Connecting Mexican Immigrants 
and Crime, WASH. POST (July 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/ 
wp/2015/07/08/donald-trumps-false-comments-connecting-mexican-immigrants-and-crime/ 
[https://perma.cc/P9SL-MH3Z].  
283. Bob Woodward & Robert Costa, Trump Reveals How He Would Force Mexico to Pay for 
the Border Wall, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-
would-seek-to-block-money-transfers-to-force-mexico-to-fund-border-wall/2016/04/05/c0196314-
fa7c-11e5-80e4-c381214de1a3_story.html [https://perma.cc/K5L6-GFC4].  
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to his Mexican ethnicity simply rest on false stereotypes. Or, perhaps 
they are rooted in statistics, especially considering that the vast majority 
of Latino Americans had a strongly negative view of Donald Trump 
during his run for the Presidency.284 Either way, in this context, these 
assumptions operate to subordinate groups of color and other 
marginalized communities in America by seeking to deny them rights 
and responsibilities, and by sending the message that they are less 
trustworthy than the white majority. 
Parts I and II have thus far summarized one theory of equal dignity 
that lies at the heart of the Equal Protection Clause while also 
articulating three versions of stereotyping that may be unconstitutional 
deprivations of equal dignity depending on context. The three variations 
of stereotyping—false, normative, and statistical—are sweeping and 
offer an uncomfortable takeaway: whenever the government enacts 
policies that affect individuals based on assumptions about groups, even 
if most people believe those assumptions to be normatively true or if the 
link between the characteristic and the group is statistically relevant, the 
government engages in stereotyping. 
The Supreme Court has tempered the consequences of characterizing 
all group-based governmental policymaking as potentially 
unconstitutional stereotyping by reviewing carefully only those 
classifications that are suspect or quasi-suspect.285 In other words, the 
judiciary applies heightened scrutiny to classifications that rest on a 
socially salient status where the risk of political disempowerment286 and 
                                                     
284. Léon Krauze, Me Gusta Trump: Portrait of a Hispanic Trump Voter, NEW YORKER (Mar. 
20, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/me-gusta-trump-portrait-of-a-hispanic-
trump-voter [https://perma.cc/24D5-TY9N] (noting that, according to early election polling, “eighty 
per cent [sic] of Latino voters held an unfavorable opinion of Trump”).  
285. Suspect class doctrine “[t]heoretically . . . treats discrimination against historically 
disadvantaged groups as suspicious and presumptively unconstitutional.” Darren Lenard 
Hutchinson, “Not Without Political Power”: Gays and Lesbians, Equal Protection and the Suspect 
Class Doctrine, 65 ALA. L. REV. 975, 978 (2014).  
286. A group’s relative lack of political power in part determines whether courts will review 
governmental classifications based on that group status with heightened scrutiny; this prong of 
suspect class doctrine originated in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 
(1938). Professor Jane Schacter explains, however, that courts do not agree on how to assess a 
group’s political power or why political powerlessness is an important factor, nor do courts 
consistently evaluate political power in determining which group classifications should receive 
heightened scrutiny. Jane S. Schacter, Ely at the Altar: Political Process Theory Through the Lens 
of the Marriage Debate, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1363, 1372–77 (2011). Schacter goes on to suggest, 
however, that courts should conceptualize political powerlessness “as an aspect of past 
discrimination—that is, as a continuing manifestation of past discrimination that has impaired the 
group in the political process.” Id. at 1403.  
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prejudice287 towards that group status is high. Race is the emblematic 
suspect classification,288 whereas sex is quasi-suspect.289 In part because 
women and people of color have suffered a long history of 
discrimination and remain structurally subordinate in the United States, 
the government’s reliance on race- and sex-based stereotypes raises a red 
flag regarding the purpose and effect of the government’s actions. Thus, 
suspect and quasi-suspect status doctrines originally developed as means 
to judicially protect women and people of color from burdensome 
governmental action, even as conservative ideological commitments 
have subverted those doctrines in the years since their inception to limit 
racial and feminist progress.290 
In light of the risk that sex and race classifications come loaded with 
prejudicial baggage that tends to subordinate rather than liberate, the 
Supreme Court has largely rejected the government’s reliance on 
stereotypes as appropriate ends and means for enacting policy.291 The 
Court has instead emphasized the importance of equal treatment across 
the board irrespective of group status and individualized assessments 
when differential treatment is necessary, eschewing even relevant 
statistical differences between groups. As Cornelia Pillard explains, 
“even statistically accurate generalizations about ‘typically male or 
female tendencies’—such as men’s greater aggressiveness versus 
                                                     
287. Race is the paradigmatic example. As the Supreme Court explained in Palmore v. Sidoti, 
466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984), “[c]lassifying persons according to their race is more likely to reflect 
racial prejudice than legitimate public concerns.”  
288. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (declaring for the first time that “all 
legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect”).  
289. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that sex classifications warrant intermediate 
scrutiny, which requires a slightly less close fit between governmental means and ends). One of the 
reasons that sex is not subject to strict scrutiny is because “real differences” between men and 
women may sometimes justify differential treatment. Justice Ginsburg noted in United States v. 
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996), that “‘[i]nherent differences’ between men and 
women . . . remain cause for celebration.”  
290. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), the Supreme Court ruled that 
all race-based classifications—even those meant to benefit racial minorities—warrant heightened 
scrutiny due to a need for judicial consistency. See id. at 229–30. The Court’s conservative 
members all joined this opinion (while the liberals dissented), and the majority opinion is widely 
understood as an attempt to limit the use of race-based affirmative action in response to right-wing 
activism. See, e.g., Russell K. Robinson, Marriage Equality and Postracialism, 61 UCLA L. REV. 
1010, 1062 (2014) (citing Adarand as an example of how the Supreme Court uses strict scrutiny “to 
scrutinize closely and often invalidate race-based policies meant to address racial subordination,” 
effectively “protect[ing] white claimants”). 
291. See supra section II.C.1.  
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women’s comparatively more cooperative temperament . . . cannot be 
grounds for official, sex-based discrimination.”292 
Based on the Court’s reasoning in cases like VMI, Craig v. Boren, and 
J.E.B., one rationale for rejecting even statistical stereotypes is to guard 
against the risk that the government may use that statistical information 
to subordinate women, or that the statistics themselves reflect normative 
stereotypes.293 Women as a group have historically been oppressed in 
both the public and domestic sphere, and the Court’s heightened scrutiny 
of sex classifications and rejection of most stereotypes seeks to combat 
that subordination.294 Moreover, governmental stereotyping can deny 
individuals the equal liberty to create and express an identity free from 
predetermined roles and their attendant social meanings. These are the 
two core pillars of equal dignity. 
The government can also deny equal dignity, however, to individuals 
who are not members of suspect or quasi-suspect groups. The LGBT 
community provides perhaps the best example of a group that, while 
never considered suspect or quasi-suspect for Equal Protection purposes 
by the Supreme Court,295 has regularly been denied equal dignity at the 
hands of the government. Historic and ongoing discrimination strongly 
suggests that the Court should review sexual orientation and gender 
identity classifications under a heightened standard of review, and 
dozens of scholars have well-argued that case.296 This Article does not 
                                                     
292. Pillard, supra note 75, at 948.  
293. In his groundbreaking work on the various kinds of stereotypes and how each works in 
antidiscrimination law, Professor Appiah highlights the “obvious connections” between normative 
and statistical stereotypes. Appiah, supra note 30, at 49. “Many of the generalizations involved in 
statistical stereotyping are true because there are normative stereotypes to which people are 
conforming.” Id.  
294. See generally Ben-Asher, supra note 112 (explaining that anti-subordination is the central 
wrong animating nearly all the Supreme Court’s sex stereotyping cases).  
295. But see generally Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151 (2016) 
(arguing that the Court implicitly applies a version of heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation-
based Equal Protection claims that effectively creates more progressive results than do strict 
scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny as applied to race- and sex-based Equal Protection claims).  
296. See, e.g., Stacey L. Sobel, When Windsor Isn’t Enough: Why the Court Must Clarify Equal 
Protection Analysis for Sexual Orientation Classifications, 24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 493, 
499 (2015) (“The Court’s clarification that heightened scrutiny should be applied to sexual 
orientation classifications in equal protection cases would provide fairness, predictability, and 
protection for lesbian, gay, and bisexual people.”); Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary 
Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753 (1996) (arguing that courts 
should apply heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation classifications); Jeffrey A. Williams, Student 
Article, Re-Orienting the Sex Discrimination Argument for Gay Rights After Lawrence v. Texas, 14 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 131, 142 (2005) (“Homosexual litigants are also entitled to greater scrutiny 
as a ‘suspect class.’”). 
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dwell on that issue. Instead, it demonstrates how the anti-stereotyping 
principle should work to promote equal dignity even when courts apply 
rational basis review to certain classifications, such as sexual 
orientation.297 Moreover, to the extent that the Supreme Court has 
emphasized subordination as the predominant wrong of stereotyping, the 
sexual orientation and transgender discrimination cases uniquely 
highlight how stereotyping can infringe on the other tenet of equal 
dignity: the equal liberty to make choices regarding the formation and 
expression of identity. 
III. STEREOTYPING THAT DOES NOT DENY EQUAL DIGNITY 
This Article has devoted considerable time to discussing cases in 
which courts have rejected or should reject the government’s reliance on 
false, normative, and statistical stereotypes about groups when acting in 
ways that affect individual group members. But does stereotyping 
always deny equal dignity? One negative consequence of a robust anti-
stereotyping doctrine that looks with skepticism at all group 
generalizations is an elevation of individuals at the expense of groups. 
An anti-stereotyping doctrine that applies forcefully any time the 
government acts to address a group organized around a suspect or quasi-
suspect trait, regardless of the government’s purpose or effect in relying 
on stereotypes, suggests that the government can rarely if ever take 
group correlated traits and behaviors into account. As antidiscrimination 
scholars have long argued, however, groups do matter.298 The following 
analysis offers an explanation for why and examples of when it may be 
desirable for the government to take certain normative and statistical 
stereotypes into account when crafting policies. 
                                                     
297. Because the Supreme Court has used strict scrutiny “consistently” under Adarand 
principles, applying strict scrutiny to classifications that both burden and benefit people of color, 
some scholars have resisted calls to elevate sexual orientation to suspect status. This resistance is 
motivated by fears that the judiciary will use strict scrutiny to thwart progressive goals. See, e.g., 
Robinson, supra note 295, at 172–73 (noting that strict scrutiny “rarely benefits people of color 
because modern racial discrimination does not rely on overt racial classifications to do its dirty 
work,” while still advocating for a transparent application of heightened scrutiny to sexual 
orientation-based Equal Protection claims). For a review of cases in which LGBTQ plaintiffs have 
won arguments under mere rational basis review, see Julie A. Nice, The Descent of Responsible 
Procreation: A Genealogy of an Ideology, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 781, 837–40 (2012) (noting that 
judges “all seem to agree that the government must prove that the fit between its means and its ends 
has some footing in social reality”).  
298. See, e.g., Zachary A. Kramer, The New Sex Discrimination, 63 DUKE L.J. 891, 945–46 
(2014) (proposing a liberty-based model for antidiscrimination law that provides ample room for 
individual identity formation and expression, but noting that this model should merely supplement 
and not replace antidiscrimination regimes focused on group status).  
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A. Group Cultures 
Groups are exceedingly important for socially stigmatized 
individuals: for many individuals, groups offer safety and solidarity, an 
avenue for political mobilization to achieve shared goals, and a template 
for creating nuanced and fully formed identities among other like-
minded people who share similar experiences, viewpoints, and cultures. 
Still, claims about group identity and group cultures are controversial. 
Such claims risk essentializing individual identities tied to group 
membership, “engaging in the very stereotyping that the 
antidiscrimination paradigm is meant to retire.”299 
Essentialization has proven problematic for courts that attempt to 
sniff out discriminatory intent in statutory disparate treatment claims 
when determining whether a defendant’s consideration of cultural 
proxies proves that discriminatory treatment is “because of” a protected 
trait.300 Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati explain that this task is 
dangerous because it could “entrench particular expressions of 
identity.”301 For example, “to say that a firm discriminated against 
[hypothetical plaintiff] because she acted black risks establishing—as a 
matter of law—what it means to be black based on the conduct in which 
[she] engaged.”302 In other words, what does it mean to “act black,” and 
does a court itself engage in stereotyping if it gleans through subtle 
evidentiary cues that a defendant discriminated against an individual due 
to the individual’s cultural manifestations of blackness? 
Richard Ford directly tackles these questions303 in his examination of 
the famous Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc.304 case. In Rogers, 
American Airlines enforced a grooming policy that prohibited male and 
female employees “from wearing an all-braided hairstyle.”305 The 
plaintiff, a Black woman, sued under Title VII, arguing that the policy 
constituted facial race discrimination.306 Underlying plaintiff’s claim is 
                                                     
299. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 782 (2002).  
300. In previous work, I spend considerable time explaining how courts sometimes reinforce 
concrete and oppressive definitions of sex and sexual orientation based identities when they 
evaluate evidence of discriminatory intent. See generally Boso, supra note 174; Boso, supra note 
162.  
301. DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE?: RETHINKING RACE IN “POST-
RACIAL” AMERICA 148 (2013). 
302. Id.  
303. FORD, supra note 32, at 27.  
304. 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).  
305. Id. at 231.  
306. Id.  
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the premise that the practice of braiding hair is central to many Black 
women’s identities307 and in fact reflects the “cultural, historical essence 
of the Black women in American society.”308 Accordingly, a policy that 
prohibits all-braided hairstyles bolsters white identity norms and 
subordinates Black women.309 
The Rogers court ruled in favor of the defendant on the basis that 
American Airlines’ grooming policy applied evenly to all individuals 
irrespective of race.310 Professor Ford acknowledges that the plaintiff’s 
argument in Rogers reflects a multiculturalist desire for the law to 
celebrate and protect group differences, but he worries that a cultural 
argument “endorses” group stereotypes rather than rejects them.311 “If 
braids are the immutable cultural essence of black women,” Ford 
wonders, then “what else is?”312 He rightly notes that the answer to that 
question is inherently “subject to debate, change, and manipulation.”313 
What we might celebrate as cultural difference in one moment might 
reek of old-school prejudice in another.314 
Yet shared cultures, however constituted, are real, and they are 
informed in part by the lived experiences of discrimination that stem 
from socially salient categories and “material arrangements like 
segregated cities.”315 They also stem from the histories and traditions 
that naturally ferment around group-based identities. Neil Gotanda 
argues that “culture-race” accounts for “all aspects of culture, 
                                                     
307. See Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and 
Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 376–81 (1991) (discussing the Rogers case and the cultural and 
political significance of all-braided hairstyles for Black women).  
308. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232 (quoting Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to 
Dismiss at 4, Rogers 527 F. Supp. 229 (No. 81 Civ. 4474)). 
309. Caldwell, supra note 307, at 383–85 (explaining that hairstyle choices are important forms 
of identity expression, and that prohibitions of all-braided hairstyles reflect social, political, and 
economic choices that condition subordinated groups to reflect norms of the dominant culture).  
310. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232.  
311. FORD, supra note 32, at 3, 23–36. 
312. Id. at 27.  
313. Id. at 71.  
314. “[T]o say that a person ‘talks white’ or ‘talks black’ is to assume that people of a particular 
race have a particular language, dialect, or rhetorical style in which they speak. That sounds 
downright offensive—tantamount to old-school racism.” CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 301, at 
47 (arguing nevertheless that these perceptions are “real” and can inform an intersectional theory of 
discrimination).  
315. IAN HANEY-LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL APPEALS HAVE 
REINVENTED RACISM & WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS 44–45 (2014).  
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community, and consciousness,” and, for Black Americans, includes 
“customs, beliefs, and intellectual and artistic traditions.”316 
Indeed, acknowledging the material and immaterial realities of shared 
cultures, progressives and social justice activists in recent years have 
increasingly drawn attention to instances of cultural appropriation as a 
form of racism and group-based oppression.317 The media frenzy 
surrounding Rachel Dolezal’s highly public “outing” in 2015 as a 
biologically white woman who identifies as Black offers a compelling 
example.318 Khaled Beydoun and Erika Wilson summarize Dolezal’s 
identity performance in the following way: 
Dolezal tanned her skin, rotated through several hairstyles 
traditionally associated with Black womanhood, helmed the 
Spokane chapter of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and obtained an 
adjunct lecturer position at Eastern Washington University in 
Africana Studies. She held herself out to the world as a Black 
woman.319 
Dolezal’s performance, Beydoun and Wilson argue, is appropriation 
done with the purpose and certainly the effect of commodifying a non-
white racial identity for personal gain at the expense of communities of 
color.320 
To acknowledge Dolezal’s identity performance as reflective of Black 
culture in some sense reinforces stereotypes about what being Black 
means. Conversely, ignoring how Dolezal’s identity pulls from Black 
culture would be colorblind in a way that perpetuates ignorance about 
how majority groups can exploit marginalized communities without 
compensation or attribution, further subordinating the already 
oppressed.321 To the point: an anti-stereotyping doctrine that rejects as 
                                                     
316. Gotanda, supra note 75, at 56.  
317. See, e.g., Angela R. Riley & Kristen A. Carpenter, Owning Red: A Theory of Indian 
(Cultural) Appropriation, 94 TEX. L. REV. 859, 864 (2016) (explaining that cultural appropriation 
occurs “in a societal context of power imbalance, racism, and inequality, rather than in an 
atmosphere of fair, open, and multilateral exchange”).  
318. See Kirk Johnson, Rachel Dolezal, in Center of Storm, Is Defiant: ‘I Identify as Black,’ 
N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/17/us/rachel-dolezal-nbc-today-
show.html [https://perma.cc/EAE8-SQCF] (Dolezal was born to two white parents and identified as 
white well into her adult life). 
319. Khaled A. Beydoun & Erika K. Wilson, Reverse Passing, 64 UCLA L. REV. 282, 287 
(2017).  
320. See id. at 292–93.  
321. See, e.g., Rebecca Tsosie, Reclaiming Native Stories: An Essay on Cultural Appropriation 
and Cultural Rights, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 299, 308, 311 (2002) (explaining that claims of cultural 
appropriation revolve around groups’ efforts to secure political and cultural sovereignty, and the act 
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invalid any correlation between certain behaviors and identities would 
have the unfortunate effect of promoting a conservative version of race, 
sex, and sexual orientation blindness.322 
Accordingly, stereotyping is not per se harmful—or, as Judith (now 
Jack) Halberstam reasons, stereotypes “are not in and of themselves 
right or wrong.”323 Instead, the moral and legal wrong of stereotyping 
depends on its purpose and effect.324 Under the Equal Protection Clause, 
as this Article explains above in Parts I and II, federal courts have 
focused particularly on how stereotyping can subordinate groups and 
unequally deny liberty with respect to individual choices regarding 
identity. This is the crux of Obergefell’s emphasis on equal dignity. 
Sometimes, however, the government’s failure to consider group-based 
normative or statistical stereotypes can subordinate groups and 
unequally deny liberty. Consider the Supreme Court’s controversial 
decision in Hernandez v. New York.325 
In Hernandez, the petitioner, Dionisio Hernandez, was charged and 
convicted of two counts of murder and two counts of criminal 
possession of a weapon.326 At the petitioner’s trial, a New York 
prosecutor used four peremptory challenges to exclude potential Latino 
jurors.327 The potential jurors’ Spanish fluency—and specifically the 
potential jurors’ ability to listen and follow the official interpreter when 
Spanish speaking witnesses took the stand—was the prosecutor’s stated 
rationale for two of those strikes,328 and petitioner challenged the 
exclusion of those two potential jurors as unconstitutional race 
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.329 Petitioner relied on 
the “close relation” between Spanish fluency and Latino identity to make 
his claim of intentional race discrimination.330 The Court rejected the 
petitioner’s claim, reasoning that, while exercising peremptive strikes 
against individuals who speak Spanish “might well result in the 
                                                     
of cultural appropriation enables dominant groups to maintain power).  
322. Yoshino, supra note 299, at 782–83 (making the same point).  
323. JUDITH HALBERSTAM, FEMALE MASCULINITY 180 (1998). Professor Halberstam explains 
that, although we tend to think of them as pejorative, stereotypes often represent a “true” subtype 
within a given group. Id.  
324. “It is important to judge the work that the stereotype performs within any 
given . . . context . . . .” Id.  
325. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).  
326. Id. at 355.  
327. Id. at 356.  
328. Id. at 356–57.  
329. Id. at 358.  
330. Id. at 360.  
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disproportionate removal of prospective Latino jurors,”331 impact alone 
is not enough. The Court went on to note that “[i]t may well be, for 
certain ethnic groups and in some communities, that proficiency in a 
particular language, like skin color, should be treated as a surrogate for 
race under an equal protection analysis”332—but not in this case. The 
Court accepted as valid the prosecutor’s concern that these individual 
potential jurors might have difficulty accepting an interpreter’s rendition 
of Spanish language testimony, and the group of persons for whom that 
concern applied consisted of both Latinos and non-Latinos.333 
Not all Latino individuals speak Spanish, of course. Yet statistically, 
more Latinos do speak Spanish than non-Latinos, and Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion for the majority in Hernandez recognizes as common knowledge 
that a “significant percentage of the Latino population speaks fluent 
Spanish” and consider it the language “used to define the self.”334 
Imagine a law that required English fluency to vote: ignoring the 
connection between Spanish fluency and Latino identity in the context of 
upholding such a law under an Equal Protection challenge would 
effectively validate race discrimination through exclusion. Similarly, the 
Hernandez Court’s refusal to view Spanish-speaking as a proxy for race 
(i.e., a statistically significant stereotype)335 in the context of excluding 
individuals from a jury denies equal dignity. In effect, “given the widely 
understood connection between Spanish fluency and cultural 
identity,”336 and the historical and ongoing discrimination against 
Latinos in the United States, the exclusion of some Spanish speakers 
from jury service in Hernandez sends a subordinating message of Latino 
group inferiority.337 Further, it denies liberty on an unequal basis: no 
English-speaking person would be excluded from performing a core 
civic duty on the basis of concerns about how their English language 
fluency affects their ability to follow instructions,338 and English fluency 
                                                     
331. Id. at 361.  
332. Id. at 371.  
333. Id. at 361.  
334. Id. at 363–64.  
335. See, e.g., Antony Page, Batson’s Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory 
Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 168–69 (2005) (characterizing a juror’s ability to speak Spanish as 
“closely associated with being Hispanic”).  
336. Herz, supra note 21, at 118.  
337. See, e.g., Miguel A. Mendez, Hernandez: The Wrong Message at the Wrong Time, 4 STAN. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 193, 193 (1993) (to Spanish speakers, Hernandez is “another painful reminder of 
how proficiency in another language is a liability”).  
338. Herz, supra note 21, at 118.  
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is a characteristic that many English speakers may consider central to 
self. 
It is important to note that recognizing group-based differences in 
culture, lived experiences, and other quirks of life does not necessarily 
mean naturalizing those differences. As Vicki Schultz argues, activists 
and lawyers should seek to disrupt differences by questioning their 
“origins and stability.”339 Those in power often use real and imagined 
differences between groups precisely to deny opportunity and create 
inequality. Those in power have also engaged in discriminatory conduct 
that effectively produces the very differences upon which others rely to 
perpetuate existing inequalities.340 Institutional actors nevertheless can 
and should account for statistical and normative group-based differences 
to combat rather than fuel oppression. 
B. The Case of LGBTQ Equality 
In Kenji Yoshino’s seminal work, Covering, he explores the myriad 
ways that law and society encourage lesbian, gay, and bisexual 
individuals to tamp down the queer components of their identities.341 
Covering is about assimilation, or trying to fit into mainstream life by 
helping others overlook a stigmatized aspect of self.342 For queer 
individuals, majority imposed and minority imposed covering 
demands343 may only become even more common as mainstream society 
lurches towards greater acceptance of LGBTQ people in theory but not 
necessarily LGBTQ people in practice.344 
Underlying the practice of covering is the idea that identity is 
performative, and that certain behaviors are recognizable as constitutive 
of group-based identities.345 Professor Yoshino makes this point in 
                                                     
339. Schultz, supra note 218, at 1107.  
340. Id.  
341. Yoshino, supra note 299, at 781, 837.  
342. Id. at 837.  
343. Professor Russell Robinson discusses the ways in which gays of color, effeminate gay men, 
religious gays, and other non-homonormative gay people experience pressure from within the 
LGBTQ community to “act gay” according to mainstream gay norms. Russell K. Robinson, 
Uncovering Covering, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1809, 1821–24 (2007).  
344. Boso, supra note 174, at 620–21; see also Alexander Nourafshan & Angela Onwauchi-
Willig, From Outsider to Insider and Outsider Again: Interest Convergence and the Normalization 
of LGBT Identity, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 521, 533–34 (2015) (discussing how gays of color still 
face barriers of acceptance both outside and within the gay community because successfully 
performing gay identity requires “self-whitewashing”). 
345. See Anthony V. Alfieri, (Un)covering Identity in Civil Rights and Poverty Law, 121 HARV. 
L. REV. 805, 811 (2008) (“[T]he demand for covering deforms the behavioral aspect of 
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Covering, and in fact articulates a list of traits and behaviors widely 
associated with lesbian, gay, and bisexual identities, including: certain 
gay fashions, gay music, gay divas, gay authors, gay magazines, gay 
neighborhoods, and gay films.346 Yoshino concedes that protecting traits 
and behaviors like these as proxies for identity risks essentializing 
identity, but argues that the alternative of identity blindness is worse 
from an equality perspective.347 Yoshino’s point here maps onto a 
central theme of this Article: the purpose and effect of stereotyping 
matters. 
1. Sodomy 
On August 3, 1982, an Atlanta policeman entered Michael 
Hardwick’s home to issue an arrest warrant on an unrelated charge and 
witnessed Hardwick having oral sex with another man.348 At the time, 
having oral or anal sex—i.e., committing sodomy—was a crime in 
Georgia.349 The ACLU brought suit in federal court, seeking a 
declaratory judgment that Georgia’s anti-sodomy statute was 
unconstitutional.350 Famously, Hardwick’s case went all the way to the 
U.S. Supreme Court.351 Although the Georgia law at issue criminalized 
all acts of sodomy and not just those committed between two people of 
the same sex, the Court analyzed the statute’s constitutionality as if it 
only applied to same-sex oral and anal sex.352 Viewed in a generous 
light,353 perhaps the Court’s singular focus on same-sex sodomy makes 
some sense: in an amicus brief, Lambda Legal argued that laws like 
Georgia’s “impose an added burden on gay people, blocking their sense 
                                                     
personhood . . . .”). See generally JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE 
SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (Lind J. Nicholson ed., 1990). 
346. Yoshino, supra note 299, at 845.  
347. Id. at 933–94.  
348. See Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. 
REV. 1551, 1612 (1993).  
349. “A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act 
involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another.” GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 
(2010).  
350. Cain, supra note 348, at 1612.  
351. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003). 
352. See Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 531 (1992).  
353. The Court’s focus on same-sex sodomy despite the statute’s application to both same and 
different-sex sodomy seems like a purposeful move to weaken the petitioner’s Substantive Due 
Process claim.  
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of self as well as their sexual fulfillment.”354 Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court upheld Georgia’s law on Substantive Due Process rather than 
Equal Protection grounds, reasoning that no right announced in the 
Court’s decisional autonomy cases “bears any resemblance to the 
claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of 
sodomy.”355 
Just seventeen years later, the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas 
struck down a Texas law that did single out same-sex sodomy for unique 
prohibition.356 The Court in Lawrence expressly overruled Bowers v. 
Hardwick,357 holding that the “liberty” guarantee in the Substantive Due 
Process Clause protects the right of an adult to have oral or anal sex with 
another consenting adult in the privacy of a home.358 Notably, Justice 
O’Connor relied on equality principles in her concurrence.359 Echoing 
Lambda Legal’s sentiment from nearly two decades prior, O’Connor 
explained, “the Texas statute makes homosexuals unequal in the eyes of 
the law” and “brands all homosexuals as criminals.”360 Just like that, 
Justice O’Connor conflated conduct with group status. Numerous 
scholars have noted this conflation with relative approval.361 
Not all gay-identified people engage in oral and anal sex.362 For 
health-related, spiritual, or a variety of personal reasons, some gay and 
                                                     
354. Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of the Respondents by Lambda Legal Defense and 
Education Fund, Inc. et al., Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (No. 85-140), 1986 WL 720449, at *30. 
355. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190–91.  
356. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. The law states, “[a] person commits an offense if he 
engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.” TEX. PENAL CODE 
ANN. § 21.06(a) (West 2003). 
357. 478 U.S. 186, overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
358. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79. For a critique of Justice Kennedy’s narrow vision of liberty 
in Lawrence v. Texas, see generally Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. 
Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (2004). “Lawrence-like decriminalization merely signals a public 
tolerance of the behavior, so long as it takes place in private and between two consenting adults in a 
relationship.” Id. at 1411. 
359. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
360. Id. at 581. 
361. See, e.g., Michael Boucai, Sexual Liberty and Same-Sex Marriage: An Argument from 
Bisexuality, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 415, 463 (2012) (noting that it makes some sense, given widely 
understood social meanings and discursive practices, to conflate sodomy and status because that 
conflation describes the “conditions under which same-sex couples actually live”); Laurence H. 
Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 1893, 1905–06 (2004) (explaining that, while it is not a “gays only” act, sodomy is associated 
with gay men and lesbians, and any anti-sodomy law is antigay “in terms of both its practical impact 
and its cultural significance”).  
362. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 348, at 1625 (“A woman who chooses another woman as her life 
partner may attribute her lesbian identity to aspects of her relationship and events in her life apart 
from actual sexual conduct.”); E. Gary Spitko, A Biologic Argument for Gay Essentialism-
 
04 - Boso.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2017  9:44 AM 
2017] DIGNITY, INEQUALITY, AND STEREOTYPES 1175 
 
bisexual individuals engage in lifelong abstinence.363 Moreover, some 
may strongly reject any conflation of sexual conduct and gay identity. 
Individuals can claim a lesbian, gay, or bisexual identity based on same-
sex desire alone: sexual conduct is not a requirement for group 
membership. Accordingly, to conflate sodomy and gay identity is to 
invoke stereotypes about what it means to be gay that do not match 
individual realities, which can deny individuals some agency in defining 
what their bisexual or homosexual identity means to them. 
Statistically speaking, of course, many LGBTQ individuals are 
sexually active and do engage in sodomy (defined as any sexual activity 
involving genital contact with another person’s mouth or anus). A legal 
prohibition on sodomy thus has the effect of tangibly harming most, but 
not all, individual LGBTQ people. Further, given the strong cultural 
associations with sodomy and LGBTQ status, legal prohibitions 
subordinate LGBTQ people as a group by sending the message that the 
primary mode of gay sexual expression is inferior to straight sexual 
expression—and, by extension, that gays are inferior to straights. 
In the context of articulating a rationale for repealing or striking down 
a law that prohibits sodomy, conflating bisexual and homosexual status 
with sodomy does not deny equal dignity. While this conflation does 
deny some LGBTQ individuals the liberty to form and express their own 
identities free of state-imposed assumptions about what that identity 
means, the purpose and effect of this state-imposed assumption are anti-
subordinating. Courts and scholars may not always agree on what 
practices subordinate and when, but acknowledging the practical and 
cultural importance that sodomy has for many LGBTQ people, for the 
purpose of decriminalization, does not effectively send a message of 
queer inferiority. Instead, operationalizing this stereotype in this context 
has the purpose and effect of dismantling an old social order that 
denigrated all queer people as worthy of moral condemnation backed by 
                                                     
Determinism: Implications for Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process, 18 U. HAW. L. REV. 
571, 597 (1996) (explaining that homosexuality is “an enduring predisposition toward an erotic, 
affectional, and romantic attraction to individuals of one’s own sex that exists independent of any 
physical sexual act”).  
363. See, e.g., Teresa M. Bruce, Doing the Nasty: An Argument for Bringing Same-Sex Erotic 
Conduct Back into the Courtroom, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1135, 1164 (1996) (explaining that lesbians 
“retain a sexual attraction toward women regardless of whether or not they have sexual relationships 
with women,” and noting that some lesbians choose celibacy); Halley, supra note 90, at 949 
(criticizing a court ruling that excluded from the class “homosexual” “[l]esbians who forego 
cunnilingus, the many gay men who have abandoned fellatio and anal intercourse to protect 
themselves and their lovers from AIDS, [and] self-identified gay men and lesbians who remain 
celibate”).  
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criminal punishment. This is therefore one example of a constitutionally 
permissible, and even desirable, use of statistical stereotypes. 
2. LGBTQ Affirmative Action 
Federal and state governments have historically invoked an 
individual’s non-straight sexual orientation as a basis for negative 
treatment. In the not-too-distant future, however, public universities and 
employers could consider lesbian, gay, and bisexual status a positive 
consideration in admission and hiring decisions.364 The U.S. Supreme 
Court has not yet ruled that sexual orientation is a suspect or quasi-
suspect status, and thus any such action would likely warrant rational 
basis judicial review.365 Under rational basis review, as Peter Nicolas 
explains, a state actor that seeks to implement an LGBTQ affirmative 
action policy “would have an extraordinary amount of flexibility, both 
with respect to the justifications for establishing such policies and the 
means employed for accomplishing those goals.”366 Governmental 
reliance on statistical stereotypes usually poses no Equal Protection 
problem under mere rational basis review. 
Even if federal courts ultimately agree that sexual orientation 
classifications warrant heightened judicial scrutiny, the government 
should be permitted to rely on some statistical stereotypes in support of 
affirmative action policies without offending equal dignity principles. 
From prior Supreme Court cases, we can imagine at least two 
justifications that a state actor might offer. In a 1986 case, Wygant v. 
Jackson Board of Education,367 a public school argued that race-based 
affirmative action in hiring and firing decisions was justified by a 
compelling interest in providing minority role models to minority 
students.368 In a 1978 case, Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke, the UC Davis Medical School argued that a race-based 
affirmative action policy in student enrollment was justified by a 
compelling interest in “increasing the number of physicians who will 
practice in communities currently underserved.”369 
                                                     
364. See Peter Nicolas, Gayffirmative Action: The Constitutionality of Sexual Orientation-Based 
Affirmative Action Policies, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 733, 735 (2015) (noting that some public 
universities have already begun to collect data on applicants’ sexual orientation and gender 
identity).  
365. Id. at 768–71.  
366. Id. at 768.  
367. 476 U.S. 267 (1968). 
368. Id. at 274.  
369. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 306 (1978). 
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In a hypothetical world in which a public university sets aside a set 
number of seats for gay and lesbian students, or just considers LGBTQ 
status to be a strong “plus” factor in decision-making, the government 
could make arguments similar to those mentioned above.370 For 
example, the government could argue that LGBTQ affirmative action 
relates to an interest in providing mentors and role models for other gay 
students. Perhaps it could argue that admitting more gay students relates 
to an interest in producing more gay professionals who will go on to lift 
other aspiring gay professionals up the ladder towards success, or who 
will serve the gay community’s needs. 
Both Wygant- and Bakke-style justifications arguably reflect 
statistical stereotypes.371 Not all teachers of color will be good role 
models for racial minority students, just as not all LGBTQ students will 
mentor other gay students or even be visible as role models (some may 
not want to be defined by sexuality or be out on campus). Similarly, not 
all physicians of color will go on to work in underserved minority 
communities, and not all gay professionals will specialize in a field 
important to the LGBTQ community or promote other gay professionals 
up the employment ladder. 
                                                     
370. If federal courts find that sexual orientation is a suspect classification, the application of 
strict scrutiny to LGBTQ affirmative action policies likely forecloses the government’s use of 
justifications similar to the aforementioned rationales offered in Wygant and Bakke. In Wygant, the 
Supreme Court held the role-model justification to be insufficiently compelling. 476 U.S. at 274–75. 
In Bakke, the Court found insufficient evidence that the means used—the race-based quota—
achieved a compelling interest in “facilitating the health care of its citizens.” 438 U.S. at 310–11. I 
join the series of scholars who have criticized the Court with respect to those holdings, yet I do not 
re-litigate the compelling nature of those justifications or the fit between the government’s means 
and ends here. See, e.g., Adeno Addis, Role Models and the Politics of Recognition, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1377, 1435–36 (1996) (offering a variety of role model theories, and arguing in favor or a 
theory that purports to provide examples for emulation and visible affirmations of the presence of 
racial minority students); Thomas E. Perez, Enhancing Access to Health Care and Eliminating 
Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health Status: A Compelling Case for Health Professional Schools 
to Implement Race Conscious Admissions Policies, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 77, 96–98 (2006) 
(citing statistical evidence that “race in and of itself is a powerful and better indicator and predictor 
of service to poor, underserved, and minority communities” than race-neutral factors).  
This Article discusses these justifications solely for the sake of argument and under an 
assumption that one of three hypothetical situations could occur: (1) a more progressive Supreme 
Court revisits and approves alternative affirmative action justifications in the future; (2) 
intermediate scrutiny applies to sexual orientation classifications and LGBTQ affirmative action 
policies require only a substantial relationship to an important governmental interest; or (3) rational 
basis review applies to sexual orientation classifications and the government is largely free to rely 
on statistical stereotypes.  
371. The Court in Bakke conceded as much: “[i]t may be correct to assume that . . . it is more 
likely [that minority doctors] will practice in minority communities than the average white doctor.” 
438 U.S. at 310–11.  
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However tainted with stereotypes, these rationales for LGBTQ 
affirmative action programs are anti-subordinating—certainly in 
purpose, and most likely in effect. The government would send the 
message that LGBTQ individuals are just as welcome in the marketplace 
of ideas as straight individuals. Some queer beneficiaries of LGBTQ 
affirmative action policies would undoubtedly go on to be role models, 
mentors, and professionals who help others along the way, thus 
removing barriers to jobs in both the private and public sector. 
Representation matters. If subordination, defined most simply, is about 
creating and reinforcing social hierarchies best exemplified by group-
based exclusion or relegation to specific roles, the effect here is quite the 
opposite: to facilitate inclusion and expand opportunities. Moreover, any 
state-sponsored ascription of meaning to gay identities through the use 
of these statistical stereotypes is negligible; more individuals than before 
would have the liberty to craft a gay identity that reflects their career 
aspirations and talents. A violation of equal dignity requires both group 
subordination and an unequal denial of individuals’ liberty to express 
identity. 
Some would disagree that the effect of affirmative action policies is to 
remedy rather than perpetuate governmental subordination. To those in 
this ideological camp, the government’s invocation of suspect and quasi-
suspect classifications for even benevolent purposes still sends a 
subordinating message. Justice Thomas, only the second Black jurist in 
the Supreme Court’s long history, is famously critical of affirmative 
action policies precisely because of the message they send. In Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,372 Justice Thomas argued that any race-based 
affirmative action policy “teaches” whites and non-whites alike that 
racial minorities “cannot compete” without paternalistic help, and that 
affirmative action policies “stamp minorities with a badge of 
inferiority.”373 In Grutter v. Bollinger,374 Justice Thomas invoked the 
specter of equal dignity by arguing, “[e]very time the government places 
citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to the provision of 
burdens or benefits, it demeans us all.”375 
This Article acknowledges that jurists and scholars do not agree on 
what practices subordinate and why. Instead of resolving that question, it 
seeks to ground a discussion of subordination on a baseline definition 
                                                     
372. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
373. Id. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
374. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
375. Id. at 353 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
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that hinges on whether the government acts with either the purpose or 
effect of disfavoring one group over another, thus establishing or 
reinforcing a social caste. Members of every group and subgroup will 
undoubtedly continue to disagree on subordinating outcomes under even 
this simplistic analytical prompt. Nevertheless, Justice Stevens’s dissent 
in Adarand offers a useful gloss on what a governmental policy that 
disfavors a group and perpetuates hierarchy looks like: “[i]nvidious 
discrimination is an engine of oppression, subjugating a disfavored 
group to enhance or maintain the power of the majority.”376 
Affirmatively relying on statistical information about a group to 
facilitate inclusion and expand opportunities for that group should not 
reasonably be understood to maintain the power of the majority. As 
Justice Stevens in Adarand went on to note, there is “a difference 
between a ‘No Trespassing’ sign and a welcome mat.”377 
3. LGBTQ Disparate Impact Claims 
One of the most tantalizing aspects of the Court’s analysis in 
Obergefell is its willingness to discuss the subordinating impact378 that 
same-sex marriage bans have on gay people absent any proof that state 
governments intended to harm gay people.379 Obergefell in fact builds 
significantly on the kind of impact analysis that United States v. Windsor 
arguably revived in 2013.380 
Since the Court’s much maligned decision381 in Washington v. 
Davis,382 a basic tenet of constitutional scrutiny is that “a law having a 
discriminatory impact, but devoid of any facial classification, will be 
subject only to rational basis review, regardless of the group affected by 
the discrimination.”383 Discriminatory intent, however, is notoriously 
                                                     
376. 515 U.S. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
377. Id. at 245.  
378. Exclusion from marriage “has the effect” of demeaning gays and lesbians. Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015).  
379. See Yoshino, supra note 103, at 174–75.  
380. Siegel, supra note 73, at 93 (explaining that, although Windsor found DOMA to be 
motivated by animus (discriminatory intent), it “radiate[s] with significance” because it also 
considers “the law’s meaning and impact with attention to the perspectives of the historically 
excluded”).  
381. See, e.g., Haney-López, supra note 70, at 1813 (“[b]y making a showing of intent a 
necessary prerequisite for establishing unconstitutionality,” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 
(1976) closed off “equal protection as a means of challenging structural harms to non-Whites”).  
382. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).  
383. Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 897 (2012).  
04 - Boso.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2017  9:44 AM 
1180 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1119 
 
difficult to prove,384 and its status as the hallmark of constitutional 
equality law has long frustrated civil rights advocates who point to 
disparate impact as the better tool for dismantling structural 
discrimination.385 The Court’s two most recent gay rights cases thus 
offer some promise that evidence of disparate impact might come to 
displace a singular search for discriminatory intent, or that disparate 
impact might at least play a larger role in the future.386 
If lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals could challenge facially 
neutral governmental policies—i.e., those that do not bestow benefits or 
burdens on the explicit basis of sexual orientation—under a disparate 
impact theory, which policies could they challenge? Michael Boucai 
discusses some theoretical possibilities based on LGBTQ activists’ 
political rhetoric in the wake of Obergefell: facially neutral policies that 
make it difficult for gays, lesbians, and bisexuals to access assisted 
reproductive technologies (ART) and adopt children.387 Given the non-
traditional methods that many gay, lesbian, and bisexual people might 
require to become parents, policies that could support an LGBTQ 
disparate impact claim include: laws that ban surrogacy contracts; laws 
that permit gametes to be donated but not sold; laws that limit the 
availability of anonymous sperm donations; and laws that require 
expensive and invasive screening procedures prior to adoption 
approvals.388 Other scholars have suggested different possible LGBTQ 
disparate impact targets regarding public “employee benefits plans tied 
to marriage.”389 What else? What about statutes criminalizing BDSM 
                                                     
384. The Supreme Court has itself noted this difficulty in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 
224 (1971), where it rejected the argument that “a legislative act may violate equal protection solely 
because of the motivations of the men who voted for it.” The Court rejected this argument largely 
due to the difficulty and futility in determining the motivations of a large group of legislators. See 
Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1108 (1989).  
385. See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of 
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1141–42 (1997) (noting the irony of the 
current heightened scrutiny framework: facially neutral policies that disparately impact women and 
people of color are largely insulated, but explicit race classifications that benefit people of color in 
employment and higher education are highly vulnerable under the Court’s evaluative use of strict 
scrutiny).  
386. Professor Laurence H. Tribe makes a similar observation, suggesting in his analysis of 
Obergefell that it “may well have laid the foundation for reexamining a longstanding but always 
controversial doctrinal obstacle” in equal protection jurisprudence that requires proof of 
discriminatory intent. Tribe, supra note 17, at 19.  
387. Michael Boucai, Is Assisted Procreation an LGBT Right?, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 1065, 1077–
80.  
388. See id. at 1108–15. 
389. J. Banning Jasiunus, Is ENDA the Answer? Can a “Separate but Equal” Federal Statute 
Adequately Protect Gays and Lesbians from Employment Discrimination?, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1529, 
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and public sex—conduct that queer theorist Pat Califia argues is 
uniquely important to the LGBTQ community?390 What about public 
employer dress and grooming codes that prohibit men from wearing nail 
polish?391 
The list of disparate impact litigation possibilities articulated above 
suggests that LGBTQ people might engage in certain conduct (ART, 
non-marital relationships, kinky sex, and colorful male accessorizing) 
statistically more often than straight people. Some of these claims may 
offend individual members of the LGBTQ community, particularly 
when the statistical correlation between conduct and group status is not 
that strong. All disparate impact claims, however, inherently pose some 
risk of statistical stereotyping because the challenged policy will not 
affect every individual group member negatively, and in fact some group 
members may support the policy or find it personally beneficial. The 
Supreme Court in a plurality opinion recently acknowledged, to 
unfortunate effect, the stereotyping risk of disparate impact claims in 
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action.392 
In Schuette, various organizations argued that a popularly enacted 
amendment to the Michigan Constitution that prohibited affirmative 
action in public education, employment, and contracting is unlawful race 
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.393 The plaintiffs did 
not raise a disparate impact claim per se, but instead relied on precedent 
that arguably required courts to “determine and declare which political 
policies serve the ‘interest’ of a group defined in racial terms.”394 The 
Court rejected this reading of relevant precedent, explaining that such an 
inquiry would involve “impermissible racial stereotypes” and 
specifically the assumption that “members of the same racial 
group . . . think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer 
the same candidates at the polls.”395 “Were courts to embark upon this 
                                                     
1551–52 (2000); see also A. Nicole Kwapisz, Classification of Homosexuals Under the Equal 
Protection Clause: Forward-Looking Disparate Impact Test, 5 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 71, 123–
24 (2011).  
390. See generally PAT CALIFIA, PUBLIC SEX: THE CULTURE OF RADICAL SEX (2d ed. 2000). 
391. See Boso, supra note 174, at 623 n.229 (discussing a gay man’s discrimination lawsuit 
stemming from an employer’s grooming and dress code policy, directed only at men, which reads in 
part: “please keep excessive makeup and nail polish to a minimum gentlemen. The only acceptable 
time for gentlemen to wear makeup or nail polish will be for Sunday Brunch during Haus of 
Mimosa”). 
392. 572 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).  
393. Id. at 1629–30.  
394. Id. at 1634.  
395. Id.  
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venture,” the Court went on to explain, “it would result in, or at least 
impose a high risk of, inquiries and categories dependent upon 
demeaning stereotypes.”396 
The Court is not wrong, of course, in reasoning that not all members 
of a group think alike. But the very nature of group identity means that 
some groups share certain interests in common and engage in certain 
conduct more often than other groups. As Russell Robinson argues, “[t]o 
find that an affirmative action ban has a racial focus and imposes special 
burdens on racial minorities, one need not conclude that all blacks 
endorse affirmative action. Surveys have consistently found that a 
majority of African Americans support affirmative action, and the Court 
could have simply said that” without implying anything “about the 
normative question as to whether blacks should support such 
policies.”397  
In other words, the existence of a disparate impact claim does not 
necessarily define the group for all members. One of the key values 
supporting disparate impact claims is the belief that facially neutral 
policies can have the effect of subordinating groups by keeping most 
individual groups members locked in an oppressive social hierarchy. 
While taking statistical stereotypes into consideration for disparate 
impact claims might deny some individuals the absolute liberty of “self-
determination and self-conception,” on balance, the conjunctive anti-
subordination principle of equal dignity can and should “protect conduct 
that is widely viewed as group-identified while accepting that some 
group members may still choose to live differently.”398 
CONCLUSION 
Conventional constitutional wisdom suggests that the government 
violates the Equal Protection Clause whenever it has the purpose or 
effect of perpetuating stereotypes, especially those based on race and 
sex. In recent years, some federal courts have extended the anti-
stereotyping doctrine to state actions regarding sexual orientation.399 
This conventional wisdom is not entirely correct. For example, some 
courts permit the government to rely on certain normative and statistical 
                                                     
396. Id. at 1635.  
397. Robinson, supra note 295, at 218.  
398. Herz, supra note 21, at 151–52.  
399. Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay Rights, 100 
VA. L. REV. 817, 826 (2014) (noting that there “is now a substantial body of case law holding that 
state action that perpetuates anti-gay stereotypes . . . is inconsistent with equal protection”).  
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stereotypes about group conduct and interests to protect individuals from 
discrimination. Stereotyping is thus not wrong in and of itself; how the 
government uses stereotypes should determine whether state action 
violates the Equal Protection Clause. The Court’s wedding of individual 
liberty and group equality in Obergefell offers one anchoring theory that 
helps explain when governmental stereotyping is a constitutional wrong: 
when it denies equal dignity. 
Governmental stereotyping denies equal dignity when it has the 
purpose or effect of subordinating a group by sending a message of 
group inferiority (most often exemplified by policies that deny a benefit 
or exclude individuals based on their group status), and when it 
unequally denies individuals the liberty to form and express their 
identities. For example, the government should not take adverse actions 
against individuals—like firing, hiring, or harassing individuals in 
school or at work—because of its reliance on normative stereotypes 
about how that individual should behave based on their group identity. 
Nor should the government deny individuals opportunities to attend the 
school of their choice or engage in civic functions because of statistical 
stereotypes about a group’s capabilities, biases, or talents. 
The government may sometimes take normative and statistical 
stereotypes into account to prevent individual disparate treatment or 
wholesale group exclusion from opportunities and civic functions. For 
example, acknowledging that most Latinos speak Spanish is a 
permissible use of statistical stereotypes to prevent the government from 
using Spanish-speaking as a proxy for race and a reason to exclude. As a 
reason to decriminalize sodomy, acknowledging that most LGBTQ 
people engage in oral or anal sex is a permissible use of statistical 
stereotypes because the purpose and effect is to eradicate rather than 
enforce a formal caste system in which queer but not straight people are 
criminalized for their sexual conduct. While considering stereotypes like 
these may affect the meanings of group identity in ways that offend 
some individual group members, the government’s failure to consider 
them could result in group subordination. 
In these and other perhaps counter-intuitive ways, “stereotyping” 
broadly defined can sometimes promote rather than deny equal dignity. 
An absolute stereotyping prohibition would exacerbate certain forms of 
race, sex, and sexual orientation blindness. Groups are important, and 
the government requires some flexibility to address group-based needs. 
 
